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WHEN STRONG ENFORCEMENT WORKS BETTER THAN 
WEAK REGULATION: THE EPA/DOJ NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every regulatory program encounters regulatees who are 
determined to do as little as possible to comply with regulatory 
requirements imposed by the applicable statute or, more typically, by 
regulations promulgated by the implementing agency.  When 
Congress or the regulatory agency uses ambiguous language to 
establish regulatory requirements or imposes those requirements in 
highly complex ways, regulatees can interpret critical words or employ 
complexity to their advantage.  In characterizing how regulatees 
comply with regulatory requirements, Professors Hickman and Hill 
divide them into three categories.1  “Maximal compliers” are risk 
averse with respect to being prosecuted for violating regulations for 
various reasons, including reputational considerations, a perceived 
alignment of interest with the regulators, or a preference for stability 
over uncertainty.2  “Flouters” have little regard for regulatory 
requirements, most of which they believe to be illegitimate, and they 
are inclined to pursue their economic interests without regard to 
those requirements.3  Even when the language of the statute or 
regulation is precise and the regulatory regime lacks complexity, 
flouters are willing to engage in what they know to be unlawful 
conduct if the risk of being prosecuted multiplied by the magnitude 
of the resulting punishment is sufficiently low.4 
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 1.  Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regu-
latory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1159–65 (2010). 
 2.  Id. at 1161. 
 3.  Id. at 1160–61. 
 4.  Id. 
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The vast majority of regulatees are in the third category of 
“minimal compliers” who “operate in the gray areas of the law.”5  
Determined to do no more than is minimally necessary to comply 
with regulatory requirements, aggressive minimal compliers search 
for ambiguity in the language of the regulatory requirements and 
exploit complexity to their maximum advantage.  They “engage 
reputable lawyers to help them calculate their compliance with great 
care, discerning in advance the gray areas of statutory and regulatory 
text and planning their behavior to conform colorably to the law.”6  
Other minimal compliers are less inclined to press the envelope of 
compliance, but will follow the more aggressive minimal compliers in 
adopting the least costly strategies that arguably comply with the 
regulatory requirements.7 
Environmental law scholars have recognized two broad 
approaches to environmental enforcement—deterrence-based 
compliance assurance and assistance-based compliance assurance.8  
The former approach provides negative incentives to discourage 
noncompliance; the latter provides positive incentives to encourage 
compliance.9  The former emphasizes the “stick” of noncompliance 
penalties; the latter emphasizes the “carrot” of compliance 
incentives.10  Advocates of strong environmental regulation prefer the 
first theory; the regulated industries vastly prefer the latter theory.11  
This Article will apply the distinction between deterrence and 
assistance more broadly to posit two broad approaches to regulatory 
implementation in mature regulatory environments where the 
underlying statutes remain static and complexity increases over time. 
The deterrence-based approach to regulation assumes that most 
regulatees are either flouters or aggressive minimal compliers.12  
                                                        
 5.  Id. at 1162. 
 6.  Id. at 1163.  Hickman and Hill cite aggressive tax shelter participants as an exam-
ple.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 1163–64. 
 8.  See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the 
Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10803, 10803 
(2000); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Doing More or Doing Less for the Environment: Shedding Light on 
EPA’s Stealth Method of Environmental Enforcement, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175, 182 
(2008); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, at 2-1 to 2-7 
(1992) [hereinafter EPA, PRINCIPLES]. 
 9.  Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,803–04. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” 
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–
4 (2000). 
 12.  Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,803–04. 
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Stringent regulations in a deterrence-based regime grow more 
complex as agency enforcers prosecute flouters, minimal compliers 
interpret their way around regulations, the agency rewrites the rules 
to eliminate loopholes, and the process begins all over again as the 
agency strictly enforces the amended rules.  The assistance-based 
approach assumes that most regulatees are maximal compliers and 
can be trusted to err on the side of compliance in interpreting 
ambiguous regulatory language.13  Regulatees only need 
encouragement and occasional assistance in negotiating complex 
regulatory regimes either by way of guidance with respect to existing 
regulations or by way of amending the regulations to make them 
clearer, less complex, or, to the extent that they are unnecessarily 
burdensome, less stringent. 
A good example of a mature regulatory regime is the regulatory 
program that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has 
created and maintained under the Clean Air Act.  From EPA’s 
inception, it has encountered regulatees in all three categories.  Not 
infrequently, the language of the statute and implementing 
regulations is subject to varying interpretations, sometimes because 
the agency wants to retain discretion to address issues on a case-by-
case basis.14  And the program is constantly evolving as its politically 
appointed leadership migrates from strict deterrence to helpful 
assistance, reflecting the broad policy preferences of different 
presidential administrations.15  As the program has evolved, it has 
invariably grown more complex, and minimal compliers and flouters 
have exploited that complexity and the ambiguity in regulatory 
language to avoid installing expensive pollution reduction 
technologies. 
This Article will examine the dynamic between deterrence-based 
and assistance-based implementation in the context of the major 
enforcement initiative that EPA and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) undertook in the late-1990s to address what they believed to 
be widespread noncompliance with the Clean Air Act’s new source 
                                                        
 13.  Id. at 10,804. 
 14.  See, e.g., S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 894–95 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (describing EPA’s failed attempt to interpret the Clean Air Act in a manner maxim-
izing its own discretion); see also Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 176 (observing that “EPA has 
translated . . . diverse statutory directives into a sweeping and complex set of environmen-
tal rules affecting a variety of activities undertaken by both private firms and by individu-
als”). 
 15.  See Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,804 (noting that “in actual practice, EPA’s 
enforcement has been closer to a hybrid of deterrence and cooperation,” and that changes 
in administrations affect which model dominates). 
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review (“NSR”) requirements.  The effort ultimately covered many 
industries, but the industry that offered the largest payoff was the 
electric power industry.  The Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) has characterized the power plant initiative as “perhaps the 
most comprehensive and coordinated enforcement effort under the 
Clean Air Act to date.”16  Focusing on fossil-fuel-fired power plants, 
this Article will describe the interaction between the aggressive 
enforcers in EPA and DOJ who were dedicated to aggressive 
deterrence-based enforcement of what they believed to be fairly 
unambiguous regulations and EPA’s politically appointed leaders 
who, during the George W. Bush administration, were such strong 
advocates of assistance-based implementation that they were willing to 
amend the underlying rules to legalize previously unlawful activities.  
It will follow the enforcement initiative through the ups and downs of 
the Bush administration as the agency leaders vigorously pursued 
rulemaking initiatives that would clarify the relevant requirements, 
but would also render them less environmentally protective.  And it 
will describe the reinvigorated enforcement initiative during the 
Obama administration as agency leaders with a different policy 
orientation backed the enforcement office’s aggressive deterrence-
based approach. 
Three aspects of this experience are relevant to the broader 
question of how agency leaders should go about choosing between 
deterrence and assistance in implementing regulatory programs.  
First, it offers an example of what can be accomplished when a 
regulatory agency and DOJ are willing to devote substantial resources 
to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative.  In short, 
the NSR enforcement story demonstrates that deterrence-based 
enforcement vigorously pursued can yield huge public benefits.  
Second, it offers a cautionary note that successful deterrence-based 
enforcement efforts take years, even decades, to reach fruition and 
can entail very large resource commitments.  Yet, in the final analysis, 
a carefully selected enforcement initiative may accomplish more than 
a major assistance-based rulemaking initiative.  Finally, the NSR 
enforcement experience teaches that, once begun, a serious 
deterrence-based enforcement initiative is difficult to stop when 
changes in administrations result in leaders who are committed to an 
assistance-based approach to regulation. 
                                                        
 16.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-590, AIR POLLUTION: EPA NEEDS 
BETTER INFORMATION ON NEW SOURCE REVIEW PERMITS 21 (2012) [hereinafter GAO, 
BETTER INFORMATION]. 
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II.  THE NSR PROGRAM 
A.  The Origins of NSR 
New source review has its origins in the 1970 amendments to the 
Clean Air Act, the statute that created the basic structure of the 
modern Clean Air Act.  Under that statute, EPA had to promulgate 
and periodically revise national primary and secondary ambient air 
quality standards for pollutants that endangered public health or 
welfare and were emitted by numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources.17  The statute gave the states an initial opportunity to 
promulgate state implementations plans (“SIPs”) capable of ensuring 
that the primary standards were attained by prescribed statutory 
deadlines.18  Thus, EPA established the air quality goals for the nation, 
and the states imposed source-specific requirements, often in the 
form of technology-based standards, that were capable of reducing 
emissions of the relevant pollutants to the extent necessary to ensure 
that the nation’s air attained those goals. 
One important exception to this institutional arrangement was 
the requirement in section 111 that EPA promulgate “new source 
performance standards” (“NSPS”) for listed categories of stationary 
sources reflecting the best adequately demonstrated control 
technologies (“BADT”).19  These technology-based standards were 
automatically incorporated into SIPs and were binding on any 
company that proposed to construct a new source (sometimes 
referred to as a “greenfield source”) within the relevant category or 
attempted to modify an existing source in that category.20  The statute 
defined the critical term “modification” to mean “any physical change 
in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which 
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.”21  
This brief definition and EPA’s various elaborations upon its meaning 
provide the substantive underpinning for the DOJ/EPA, NSR 
enforcement initiative. 
                                                        
 17.  42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2006). 
 18.  Id. § 7410(a)(1).  The statute recognizes the possibility of an extension for anoth-
er five years.  Id. § 7502(a)(2). 
 19.  Id. § 7411(a)(1), (d).  The term “stationary source” was defined to be “any build-
ing, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.”  Id. 
§ 7411(a)(3). 
 20.  See id. § 7411(a)(2) (defining “new source”). 
 21.  Id. § 7411(a)(4).  Existing sources in categories for which EPA had not promul-
gated an NSPS were free to undertake any physical or operational changes so long as they 
did not violate the requirements of the relevant SIPs.  Id. at § 7411(d). 
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Insofar as the federal technology-based requirements were 
concerned, the 1970 statute effectively “grandfathered” existing 
sources.22  They were subject to any technology-based requirements 
that the states imposed in their SIPS, but they were only subject to the 
federal NSPS if they were modified within the meaning of the 
regulations.23  Congress apparently understood that industrial 
facilities were not designed to last forever.24  As companies gradually 
replaced units with new plants outfitted with modern pollution 
controls capable of meeting the NSPS, emissions would automatically 
decrease.  Since it was presumably much less costly to design pollution 
control into a new plant than to retrofit it into an existing plant, 
Congress may have deemed it more efficient to leave existing sources 
to state regulation so long as they were not modified in ways that 
increased emissions.25 
The NSPS for coal-fired electric power plants has been, far and 
away, the most controversial standard in this program for at least 
three reasons.  First, electric power plays a vital role in the U.S. 
economy and in the comfort and convenience of its citizens.26  
Second, coal has traditionally fired the majority of power plants in the 
country.27  Third, coal-fired power plants are among the largest 
stationary-source emitters of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and 
                                                        
 22.  Jonathan R. Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regula-
tion: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678 (2007). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See id. at 1681–82 (“[T]he legislative history of the Clear Air Act’s . . . amendments 
strongly suggests that Congress in 1970 expected grandfathering of these sources to be 
only temporary.”); David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 195 (2005) (“Congress may have intended that this provi-
sion operate gradually to widen the scope of coverage of the new source permitting provi-
sions as old plants were replaced or modified, so that over time the number of exempted 
plants would dwindle to zero.”); BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. 
COMM’RS, GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARABILITY: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF AIR EMISSION REGULATIONS AND ELECTRICITY MARKET DISTORTIONS 11–12 
(1998) (citing interviews with participants in the drafting process). 
 25.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET A-2001-19, NSR 90-DAY REVIEW BACKGROUND 
PAPER 2 (2001) [hereinafter NSR BACKGROUND PAPER] (“Congress believed incorporating 
pollution controls into the design and construction when new units are built or when old 
ones are modified significantly is generally the most efficient way of controlling pollution 
from major sources.”). 
 26.  See DANIEL YERGIN: THE QUEST (2011) (“Electricity underpins modern civiliza-
tion.”). 
 27.  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1981); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & 
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A 
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD 
BE DONE ABOUT IT 1–2 (1981). 
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oxides of nitrogen,28 three of the criteria pollutants that have always 
been the central focus of the Clean Air Act’s regulatory regime.  All 
three of these pollutants are major contributors to respiratory disease; 
two of them (sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen) damage nearby 
crops and natural vegetation and are transported long distances by 
the wind and contribute to acid rain; two of them (sulfur dioxide in 
the form of sulfates and particulate matter) damage visibility in 
pristine areas; and one of them (particulate matter) is strongly 
associated with increased human mortality.29  Coal-fired power plants 
are also major emitters of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas pollutant 
that EPA had not attempted to regulate until recently.30  Finally, even 
minor differences among options for reducing pollutant emission 
rates for power plants can have major impacts on human health and 
the environment over the plants’ forty-year life expectancy.31 
B.  Defining “Modification” 
At first glance, the definition of “modification” in the statute32 
seems straightforward enough.  Strictly construed, any physical or 
operational change, no matter how trivial or tangential to the source’s 
primary functions, that increased the amount of any air pollutant 
emitted from the relevant source would give rise to an obligation to 
retrofit technology capable of meeting the NSPS for that source.33  It 
soon became apparent to the agency, however, that this 
straightforward definition needed further elaboration.  The agency 
concluded that Congress did not intend to include “mundane 
activities” like “the repair or replacement of a single leaky pipe, or a 
change in the way that pipe is utilized.”34  A strict interpretation of the 
                                                        
 28.  Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 313; ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 27, at 129. 
 29.  Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 313; Richard E. Ayres & David D. Doniger, New Source 
Standard for Power Plants II: Consider the Law, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 74 (1979); William 
C. Banks, EPA Bends to Industry Pressures on Coal NSPS—and Breaks, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 67, 76–
79 (1980). 
 30.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding EPA’s authority to regu-
late carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act); see also Clean Air Act and Increased Coal Use: 
Environmental Protection Agency Oversight, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Env’t, Energy, and 
Natural Res., 96th Cong. 301–02 (1979) (statement of Alan T. Crane & Steven E. Plotkin, 
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress) (acknowledging, presciently, the link 
between carbon dioxide emissions, coal plants, and global warming and foreshadowing the 
coming debate). 
 31.  Ayres & Doniger, supra note 29, at 75. 
 32.  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2006). 
 33.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1681. 
 34.  Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; 
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New 
  
2013] NEW SOURCE REVIEW ENFORCEMENT 1211 
definition could also include every maintenance or repair project 
necessary to keep a plant running safely and efficiently if it also 
increased the amount of emissions over the amount immediately 
preceding the project.   
The word “modification” was sufficiently vague, the regulators in 
EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation (“OAR”) reasoned, that the agency 
could promulgate a regulation interpreting that word to avoid 
prosecuting companies that engaged in routine projects designed 
merely to keep the facility running smoothly.  In 1971, EPA 
promulgated a regulation defining “modification” to exclude routine 
maintenance, repair, and replacement; an increase in production 
rate, if the increase did not exceed the operating design capacity of 
the affected facility; an increase in hours of operation; and use of 
alternative fuel or raw material if the affected facility could 
accommodate such use.35 
Having assisted the industry by addressing ambiguous statutory 
language with a clarifying regulation, EPA’s first administrator, 
William Ruckelshaus, adopted a vigorous deterrence-based approach 
to enforcing the regulations promulgated under the new statute.36  
Ruckelshaus later related that “it was important for us . . . to actually 
show we were willing to take on the large institutions in the society 
which hadn’t been paying much attention to the environment.”37  The 
agency realized that it lacked the manpower to file many lawsuits and 
pursue them to completion, but it was determined to send a message 
to flouters and minimal compliers that it meant business.38  The EPA 
and the states decided on a case-by-case basis in individual 
enforcement actions whether particular projects came within the 
routine maintenance, repair and replacement (“RMRR”) exclusion 
based on several factors, including the nature, extent, purpose, 
frequency, and cost of proposed activities.39 
                                                        
Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,316 (July 21, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Imple-
mentation Plan Rules]. 
 35.  Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876, 24,877 
(Dec. 23, 1971). 
 36.  Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Interdisciplinary Aspects of Environment Enforce-
ment, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10,495, 10,499–500 (2006). 
 37.  William D. Ruckelshaus: Oral History Interview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/publications/print/ruck.html (last updated Dec. 
10, 2012). 
 38.  Richard S. Frank, Environment Report/EPA and Justice Department Clash over Antipollu-
tion Enforcement, NAT’L J., Oct. 9, 1971, at 2048. 
 39.  Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 1990); Nash & Revesz, 
supra note 22, at 1678, 1684–85; GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13. 
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The agency promulgated another assistance-based regulation in 
1975 to address confusion that had arisen among regulatees 
concerning the kinds of changes that would and would not subject 
sources to the NSPS.  Among other things, the new regulation 
clarified that a modification to an “affected facility” within an existing 
source subjected only that facility, and not the entire source, to the 
NSPS if EPA had promulgated an NSPS for that facility.40  Another 
change, referred to as “netting,” allowed a source to avoid the NSPS 
for individual units within the source if the net emissions from all 
units affected by the project did not increase.41  A “net emissions 
increase” was defined to be the increase in “emissions from a 
particular physical or change in the method of operation” together 
with any other “contemporaneous” increases or decreases in actual 
emissions from the other affected units, where “contemporaneous” 
was defined to include any increases or decreases within the previous 
five years.42 
The 1975 regulation defined the critical term “increase” to mean 
an increase in the number of kilograms of pollutant emitted per 
hour.43  It also added to the list of exemptions: (1) an increase in a 
facility’s “production rate” if that increase could “be accomplished 
without a capital expenditure on that facility,” and (2) the addition or 
use of any system or device the “primary function” of which was to 
reduce air pollution, except for removing an emission control system 
or replacing one with a system that the Administrator deemed to be 
“less environmentally beneficial.”44  Finally, the 1975 rule stated that 
the NSPS applied to existing facilities that underwent 
“reconstruction,” regardless of whether it resulted in an increase in 
emissions, if the fixed capital cost of the reconstruction exceeded fifty 
percent of the fixed capital cost needed to construct a comparable 
facility and if complying with the NSPS was economically and 
technologically feasible.45 
The agency’s emphasis on deterrence-based enforcement 
continued throughout the Carter presidency under Administrator 
                                                        
 40.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1685. 
 41.  Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3282, 3282 (Jan. 16, 1979); 
Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1687. 
 42.  40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3) (2012); Notice of Availability; Alternatives for New Source 
Review (“NSR”) Applicability for Major Modifications; Solicitation of Comment, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 39,857, 39,857 n.1 (July 24, 1998) [hereinafter Notice of Availability]. 
 43.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1686. 
 44.  40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(2), (5) (2012). 
 45.  Id. § 60.15(b). 
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Douglas Costle.46  Assistant Administrator for Enforcement Marvin 
Durning initiated a “file first/negotiate later” policy under which 
regional offices were required to refer all major violations directly to 
EPA headquarters before negotiating with violators.47  Having seized 
greater control over agency enforcement efforts, Durning aggressively 
exercised the new powers that the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air 
Act provided to the agency, which included a strong noncompliance 
penalty.48 
C.  The 1977 CAA Amendments 
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Act49 addressed two issues 
that Congress had not anticipated in 1970.  First, EPA was struggling 
with how to address the many “nonattainment” areas that had not met 
the NAAQS by the 1977 deadline.50  Second, the agency had to 
address a judicially imposed requirement to prevent significant 
deterioration of air quality in “clean air” areas of the country where 
the air currently met the national ambient air quality standards.51  The 
1977 amendments addressed both problems by establishing permit 
requirements for new sources and modifications of existing sources 
that had the potential to emit large quantities of pollutants.52  The 
term that practitioners used to describe the process of determining 
whether new facilities or modifications of existing facilities qualified 
for the permit requirement was NSR.53 
Before a company could obtain a permit for erecting a new 
major stationary source or undertaking a major modification of an 
existing major source in a nonattainment area, it had to meet a 
number of statutory requirements, including installing technology 
                                                        
 46.  Mintz, supra note 36, at 10,500. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 7420 (2006). 
 49.  Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). 
 50.  Envtl. Law Inst., History—The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 2 L. OF ENVTL. 
PROT. § 12:90 (2012). 
 51.  Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated as moot in light of 
1977 amendments, W. Energy Supply and Transmission Assocs. v. EPA, 434 U.S. 809 (1977). 
 52.  A state had the option of drafting its own NSR program and seeking EPA approval 
of that program or requesting that EPA delegate the program that EPA had promulgated 
in its regulations.  NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 2. 
 53.  New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Makram B. Jaber, Util-
ity Settlements in New Source Review Lawsuits, 18 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 22, 22 (2004) (discussing 
the enforcement actions brought by the EPA against electric utility companies for alleged 
violations of the Clean Air Act’s NSR); NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 2 (“The 
purpose of the [NSR] program is to protect public health and welfare, as well as national 
parks and wilderness areas, even as new sources are built and existing sources expand.”). 
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capable of meeting the “lowest achievable emissions rate” (“LAER”).54  
To obtain a permit in an area that was not in a nonattainment area, 
sometimes called a “prevention of significant deterioration” (“PSD”) 
area, a company had to install the “best available control technology” 
(“BACT”), as determined by the permitting agency on a case-by-case 
basis.55  For purposes of the nonattainment permit program, the term 
“major stationary source” was defined to include any source with the 
potential to emit 100 tons per year of any air pollutant.56  For 
purposes of the PSD permit program, the term “major emitting 
facility” was defined to include any source on a list of twenty-eight 
specified categories that had the potential to emit 100 tons per year 
(“tpy”) of any air pollutant and any other source with the potential to 
emit 250 tpy.57 
For both programs, the statute defined “modification” to have 
the same meaning as in the NSPS program.58  Thus, Congress 
continued to grandfather existing sources from these more heavily 
regulated programs so long as they did not undertake a 
modification.59  Since the 100 tpy and 250 tpy thresholds applied to 
the emissions from the existing source, however, it was unclear 
whether every physical or operational change that resulted in a very 
minor increase in emissions from such a large source would subject 
the entire source to the rigorous NSR requirements or whether EPA 
could by rule establish separate de minimis thresholds, called 
“significance levels” for such modifications.  The EPA addressed this 
issue in its implementing regulations for the PSD program by 
defining “modification” to mean “a physical or operational change 
that increased a source’s ‘potential to emit’ pollutants, defining that 
term to mean a source’s potential to emit pollutants without any 
                                                        
 54.  42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(B)(2) (2006). 
 55.  Id. § 7475(a)(4).  Neither LAER nor BACT could be less stringent than any appli-
cable new source performance standard.  LARRY B. PARKER & JOHN E. BLODGETT, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30432, AIR QUALITY AND ELECTRICITY: ENFORCING NEW SOURCE 
REVIEW 19–20 (2000). 
 56.  42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2006). 
 57.  Id. § 7479(1). 
 58.  See id. § 7479(2)(C) (defining “construction” for the PSD program as including 
“the modification (as defined in section 7411 . . .) of any source or facility”); id. § 7501(4) 
(defining modification for the nonattainment program as meaning “the same as the term 
“modification is used in section 7411”); see also 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra 
note 34, at 32,315 (“The 1970 CAA required EPA to promulgate technology-based NSPS 
applicable to the construction or modification of stationary sources that cause or contrib-
ute significantly to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.” (citation omitted)). 
 59.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1684–85. 
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pollution controls in place, and limiting NSR to “major” 
modifications that resulted in increased emissions of 100 or 250 tpy, 
depending on the category.60 
At the same time that Congress provided for NSR, it empowered 
ordinary citizens to insist that modified sources comply with the 
process by creating a procedure for citizen enforcement of those 
provisions.  Section 304 of the Clean Air Act provides that “any person 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf  . . . against any 
person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or modified 
major emitting facility without a permit.”61  At least sixty days prior to 
commencing a citizen enforcement action, the citizen must give 
notice of the violation to EPA, to the state in which the violation took 
place, and to the violator.62  If EPA or the state, within the sixty days, 
intervenes and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in court, then 
the citizen enforcement action may not proceed, but the citizen may 
remain a party to the governmental enforcement action with full 
participatory rights.63 
D.  The Alabama Power Litigation 
Industry and environmental groups challenged the agency’s PSD 
implementation regulations, and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit in late 1979 rendered a decision 
that sent EPA back to the drawing board on the NSR provisions.64  
First, the court held that “potential to emit” meant the potential of a 
source to emit pollutants with all of the pollution control 
technologies in place.65  This had the effect of dramatically reducing 
the number of new and existing facilities that came within the 
definition of “major emitting facility” and were therefore subject to 
NSR.66  Second, it held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority in 
excluding from the definition of modification all physical and 
operational changes that resulted in emissions of fewer than 100 and 
250 tpy.67  Although EPA had inherent discretion to promulgate 
                                                        
 60.  Id. at 1687 (quoting Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans: 
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments to Prevent Significant Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388, 
26,403 (June 19, 1978)). 
 61.  42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (2006). 
 62.  Id. § 7604(b)(1)(A). 
 63.  Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B). 
 64.  Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 65.  Id. at 353. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 399–400. 
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regulations defining de minimis emissions thresholds for changes that 
would not come within the meaning of the word “modification,” it 
could not merely incorporate the same thresholds that the statute 
specified for determining whether new construction activities were 
subject to NSR.68  Otherwise, the court explained, grandfathered 
sources would gain a perpetual immunity from federal technology-
based requirements, despite a clear congressional intent to give 
existing stationary sources only a temporary reprieve.69 
E.  The Post-Alabama Power Regulations (1980) 
EPA responded to the court’s remand in 1980 with a new set of 
regulations that, among other things, applied the statutory 
“majorness” thresholds (100/250 tpy) to new and existing sources and 
created separate significance levels for modifications of existing major 
sources.  The new significance levels effectively exempted from the 
statute’s NSR requirements any physical or operational change in a 
relevant unit that resulted in an emissions increase of fewer than forty 
tpy of sulfur dioxide (“SO2) or nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) in PSD areas 
and changes that resulted in an increase of fewer than 10–100 tpy in 
nonattainment areas, depending on the severity of the 
nonattainment.70  Like the NSPS regulations, the NSR regulations also 
exempted RMRR projects and increases in hours or production rates, 
and they allowed sources to offset emissions increases in the changed 
unit with decreases from other affected units within a single source in 
determining whether there would be a net emissions increase.71  
Although these provisions turned out to be highly contestable in 
subsequent litigation, they received very little attention from either 
the agency or the interested parties during the 1980 rulemaking.72  In 
one significant departure from the 1975 NSPS regulations, the NSR 
regulations measured increases in tons per year, rather than 
kilograms per hour, to be consistent with the tons per year approach 
that Congress had used in defining the statutory “majorness” 
                                                        
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 400. 
 70.  See NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 3; (noting the 10–100 tpy major 
source threshold range for nonattainment NSR); PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 7 
(noting that NSR is triggered when a modification will cause a forty-tpy increase in oxides 
of sulfur and nitrogen). 
 71.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1688–89; NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, 
at 4.  The NSR definition of modification tracked the PSD definition.  Id. 
 72.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1689. 
  
2013] NEW SOURCE REVIEW ENFORCEMENT 1217 
thresholds.73  As we shall see, this distinction between annual 
emissions and hourly emissions was fiercely debated in the subsequent 
NSR enforcement litigation, and the issue ultimately had to be 
resolved by the Supreme Court.74 
F.  Avoiding NSR During the Reagan Administration 
As President Reagan entered office in early 1981, the operators 
of existing sources were just becoming familiar with the two-step NSR 
process.75  First, the operator of an existing major source had to 
determine whether the project would result in a physical or 
operational change.76  If the project fell within one of the specified 
exemptions, such as the RMRR or increased hours of operation 
exemptions, then it did not constitute a physical or operational 
change and was therefore not subject to NSR.77  If the project did 
involve a physical or operational change, the operator had to 
determine whether emissions attributable to the project would exceed 
the significance level.78 In making that determination, the operator 
had to subtract the baseline level of emissions (the level of emissions 
from the source just prior to the anticipated project) from the 
potential emissions from the source after the project’s completion, 
summing contemporaneous increases and decreases of emissions 
from the project and other units within the source that were affected 
by the project.79  If so, the project had to undergo NSR.80  Both steps 
often involved complex determinations based on multiple factors and 
imprecise regulatory language, all of which created ample gray areas 
for minimal compliers to exploit.81 
                                                        
 73.  1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,316; PARKER & BLODGETT, 
supra note 55, at 7. 
 74.  Envtl. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007). 
 75.  See New Source Review Policy, Regulations and Enforcement Activities, Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. 606 
(2002) [hereinafter Senate NSR Policy Hearings] (statement of John Walke, Clean Air Direc-
tor, Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”)) (testifying about the history of NSR 
enforcement). 
 76.  1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,316; GAO, BETTER 
INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13. 
 77.  GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13. 
 78.  1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,316. 
 79.  Alternatives for New Source Review (NSR) Applicability for Major Modifications, 
63 Fed. Reg. 39,857, 39,857–58 n.l (July 24, 1998). 
 80.  Id. at 39,857. 
 81.  See GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13 (discussing the complexity of 
the determinations). 
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The operators of fossil-fuel-fired power plants had strong 
incentives to avoid NSR.82  Electricity deregulation was just getting 
underway, and utility companies could no longer live the comfortable 
life of a regulated monopoly in which they could pass through to their 
customers any expenditures incurred in installing pollution controls.83  
In addition, many companies were relying on power plants that were 
nearing or past the end of their planned lifetimes, and they were 
contemplating the possibility of replacing them with nuclear power 
plants.84  When the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility 
rendered that option considerably less attractive, they were left with 
coal as the only realistically available fuel.85  But building new coal 
plants would be very expensive because of EPA’s recently tightened 
NSPS for fossil-fuel-fired steam electric plants86 and because states 
were not always expeditious in granting the necessary permits.87  
Refurbishing the old plants was a much less expensive option.88 
The Reagan administration adopted a friendly assistance-based 
approach to implementation.89  Administrator Ann Gorsuch was not 
disposed to file enforcement actions against companies that had not 
complied with the complex and, to many companies, unfamiliar NSR 
requirements.90  In her view, the goal should be to encourage future 
                                                        
 82.  See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283 
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (acknowledging that “power plant operators have an obvious incentive to 
make a ‘reasonable’ prediction that the stricter emissions standards will not be implicat-
ed”). 
 83.  See Spence, supra note 24, at 203 n.85 (citing legal scholarship). 
 84.  Clearing the Air: An Oversight Hearing on the Administration’s Clean Enforcement Pro-
gram, Hearing Before the S. Dem. Pol. Comm. 2 (2004) (statement of Bruce Buckheit, former 
enforcement chief, EPA) [hereinafter Buckheit Testimony]. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 114 (responses of Jeffrey 
Holmstead, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) (stating that it cost one 
California facility $100,000 per ton of nitrogen oxide to meet the NSR standard); LARRY B. 
PARKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 85–50 ENR, THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND PROPOSED 
ACID RAIN LEGISLATION: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 46 (1985) (“With new power-
plants costing over $1000 a Kilowatt to construct, utilities have powerful incentives to avoid 
construction and to rehabilitate older facilities instead.”). 
 87.  Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 114 (responses of Jeffrey Holmstead, 
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA). 
 88.  Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 2. 
 89.  William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water 
Act, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 72 (2007). 
 90.  JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 46 (1984); Senate NSR Policy Hearings, 
supra note 75, at 606 (statement of John Walke, NRDC); Elizabeth Shogren, Decision Near 
on Air Rule Review, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at A2 [hereinafter Shogren, Decision Near]. 
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compliance, not punish past violations.91  In this environment, when 
even flouters escaped close scrutiny, minimal compliers had every 
incentive to expand the range of reasonable interpretation and little 
reason to expect that EPA would file enforcement lawsuits if they 
crossed over the line into illegality.92  Subsequently produced industry 
documents disclosed a conscious strategy during the 1980s of meeting 
increased demand by building additional capacity into grandfathered 
plants while studiously avoiding NSR.93  For example, an industry 
trade association advised its members in 1984 to identify such projects 
as “upgraded maintenance programs” and to “downplay the life 
extension aspects of these projects (and extended retirement dates) 
by referring to them as plant restoration . . . projects.”94  If questions 
arose, the industry group advised its members to deal exclusively with 
state and local officials and to avoid “ask[ing] EPA because you won’t 
like the answer.”95  Rather than go to EPA or Congress for relief, 
companies hired lawyers who came up with innovative interpretations 
of the then-obscure RMRR exemption to characterize as “routine” 
projects that had the effect of expanding capacity and lengthening 
plant lifetimes.96  It would be hard to find a better example of the 
minimal compliance strategy in action. 
III.  THE WEPCO LITIGATION 
During the mid-1980s, EPA and the state permitting authorities 
determined whether specific projects at existing plants triggered the 
NSR requirements by employing the two-step analysis described above 
on a case-by-case basis.97  This common sense approach, however, did 
little to advance the overall statutory policy of ensuring that older 
units at power plants would be replaced by more efficient and less 
polluting units.  In 1985, the Congressional Research Service reported 
that the retirement age for power plants had increased from thirty 
                                                        
 91.  LASH ET AL., supra note 90, at 46; Andreen, supra note 89, at 72; Barry Boyer & Er-
rol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Un-
der Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 876 (1985); Mintz, supra note 36, at 
10,501. 
 92.  Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 606 (statement of John Walke, NRDC). 
 93.  Clean Air Act: New Source Review Regulatory Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 
106th Cong. 99 (2000) [hereinafter Senate Clean Air Act Hearings] (statement of David 
Hawkins, NRDC). 
 94.  Id. at 100. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 2. 
 97.  Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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years to as long as sixty years.98  Although EPA enforcers occasionally 
lowered the boom on flouters who built brand new facilities without 
applying for a PSD permit,99 they did not focus much attention on 
modifications to existing facilities.100  A new plant was quite visible to 
state officials and nearby neighbors, but a life-extension project at an 
existing plant that resulted in only slightly elevated emissions was 
largely invisible to the public and the press. 
A.  The 1990 WEPCO Litigation  
In 1988, EPA concluded that a major project undertaken by 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (“WEPCO”) at its Port 
Washington plant near Milwaukee, Wisconsin had to undergo NSR 
because the potential emissions from the facility after completion of 
the project would exceed the actual emissions prior to the project.101  
The facility contained five coal-fired steam generating units, each with 
a design capacity of eighty megawatts, that were constructed between 
1935 and 1950.102  During the intervening years, the output had 
decreased substantially due to age-related deterioration.103  After 
hiring a consultant in 1983 to assess the plant’s overall condition, the 
company decided that the fire units and the plant’s common facilities 
would have to undergo “extensive renovation” to keep the facility in 
operation.104  Among other things, the study concluded that the air 
heaters on four of the units had severely deteriorated, and the rear 
steam drums on a different four facilities had cracked.105  The first 
condition kept four of the units from operating at full capacity, and 
the second condition required a reduction in pressure to prevent a 
blowout.106  The risk of a blowout was so serious at one of the units 
that the company had shut it down altogether.107 
The company then embarked on what it called a “life extension” 
project consisting of various renovations that allowed the units to 
                                                        
 98.  PARKER ET AL., supra note 86, at 46. 
 99.  See, e.g., United States v. La.-Pac. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1162–63 (D. Colo. 
1988). 
 100.  Cassie N. Aw-yang, EPA’s Changes to the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement 
Rule of the New Source Review Program: An Unlawful Threat to Public Health and Welfare? 27 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 321, 336 (2004); Spence, supra note 24, at 198. 
 101.  Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 905–06; PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 8. 
 102.  Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 905. 
 103.  Id. at 905. 
 104.  Id. at 905 (emphasis omitted). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 905–06. 
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operate beyond their planned retirement dates of 1992 in the case of 
two of the units and 1999 in the case of the other three.108  When 
WEPCO presented its plan to the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission for approval, the commission consulted with the state 
Department of Natural Resources to determine whether a PSD permit 
was necessary.109  The department referred the matter to EPA, which 
conferred with the company on several occasions.110   
On September 1, 1988, the Acting Assistant Administrator for 
Air, Don R. Clay, circulated a memorandum containing his 
preliminary conclusion that the project would be subject to NSR.111  
Among other things, the memorandum rejected WEPCO’s claim that 
the project fit within the RMRR exemption.112  In a separate 
memorandum, issued on February 15, 1989, Clay determined that 
WEPCO could not meet its responsibilities merely by switching to low-
sulfur coal; it would have to install scrubbers or equivalent 
technologies capable of removing sulfur dioxide from the gas 
stream.113  EPA Administrator Lee Thomas accepted the Clay 
memorandum, and the company appealed to the Seventh Circuit.114  
Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of three major utility companies 
and trade associations, as well as the National Coal Association, 
General Electric and Westinghouse.115 
On January 19, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO), 
upheld EPA’s decision in all but one regard.116  The court first 
rejected WEPCO’s claim that the project did not involve a “physical 
change.”117  It noted that the project included the replacement of four 
steam drums that were sixty feet long, 50.5 inches in diameter and 
5.25 inches thick as well as the air heaters in four units over a four-
year period during which each unit would be shut down for nine 
months.118  In the court’s view, these projects clearly constituted 
“physical change[s].”  To WEPCO’s argument that a simple 
replacement of equipment did not modify the facility, the court 
                                                        
 108.  Id. at 906. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 919 (citing congressional reports). 
 114.  Id. at 906. 
 115.  Id. at 903–04. 
 116.  Id. at 901, 919. 
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responded that the statute defined “modification” as “any physical 
change” that increased emissions, and the life extension project 
clearly involved physical changes at the facility.119  The court reasoned 
that “Congress intended to stimulate the advancement of pollution 
control technology,” and allowing companies to avoid NSR 
indefinitely was inconsistent with that goal.120 
The court also rejected WEPCO’s contention that the changes 
came within the RMRR exemption.  Taking its cue from the Clay 
memorandum, the court observed that EPA made this determination 
on a case-by-case basis by “weighing the nature, extent, purpose, 
frequency, and cost of the work, as well as other relevant factors, to 
arrive at a common-sense finding.”121  Based on these factors, EPA had 
determined that WEPCO’s proposed changes were not “routine.”122  
The court agreed that “the magnitude of the project (as well as the 
down-time required to implement it) suggest[ed] that it [was] more 
than routine.”123  Furthermore, the court agreed with EPA that the 
frequency and cost of the project supported the conclusion that 
replacing the heaters was far from routine.124  In this regard, the court 
stressed WEPCO’s own characterization of the project as a “life 
extension” project of the sort that “would normally occur only once 
or twice during a unit’s expected life cycle.”125  Although it was true 
that any repair of a critical component of a unit would technically 
extend its life, EPA was not arbitrary in concluding that a project 
intended to put off retirement of the entire plant by at least ten years 
was not routine.126 
WEPCO also argued that the change would not result in an 
increase in emissions for purposes of the new source performance 
standard for power plants.127  It acknowledged that the replacement 
program would increase emissions, because the units would again be 
able to operate at their design capacity, but it argued that the agency 
had arbitrarily interpreted its regulations to include such increases.128  
In determining the pre-change emissions, the agency ignored the 
“design capacity” of the unit and focused exclusively on the “actual 
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current capacity” of the unit to produce emissions.129  Using the most 
recent year’s emissions from all of the units as the baseline, the 
agency concluded that the life extension project would cause no 
additional emissions at two of the five plants, but would cause an 
increase in emissions at the other three units.130  Noting that it did not 
have jurisdiction to overturn the NSPS regulation (because exclusive 
jurisdiction for challenge to EPA regulations under the Clean Air Act 
lies in the D.C. Circuit131), the court upheld EPA’s interpretation of 
that regulation to allow it to compare the most recent year’s hourly 
emissions rate instead of a “representative” year’s rate.132 
On the separate question of whether the contemplated changes 
would trigger NSR under EPA’s PSD regulations, the agency did not 
fare as well.  The NSR regulations for PSD areas required a permit for 
any physical change in a “major stationary source” that would result in 
a “significant” increase in “net emissions.”133  EPA interpreted this 
regulation to require the source’s operator to compare “actual pre-
renovation emissions with potential post-renovation emissions” 
(measured in tons per year) to determine whether the difference 
exceeded the “significance” thresholds (ordinarily forty tons per 
year).134  In determining the baseline emissions the regulations 
required the source to use the average rate (in tons per year) for the 
two years preceding the project date, unless EPA determined that a 
different time period would be more representative.135  In WEPCO’s 
case, the agency used the years 1983 and 1984 as the representative 
years because WEPCO had curtailed production during the year 
preceding the project due to the safety risks posed by the cracked 
steam drums.136 
Although the agency’s regulations applied to “an ‘increase in 
actual emissions from a particular physical change,’” the agency 
interpreted this language to require a comparison of the plant’s 
baseline emissions with the plant’s “potential to emit” after the 
project was completed.137  WEPCO argued that this was an arbitrary 
and capricious interpretation of the regulations because it was 
                                                        
 129.  Id. at 913 (emphasis omitted). 
 130.  Id. at 913–14. 
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inappropriate in calculating post-renovation emissions to assume that 
the plant would be operating at 100 percent capacity 24 hours a day 
for 365 days per year.138  EPA responded that WEPCO could avoid that 
result by agreeing to adhere to federally enforceable production 
restrictions, but WEPCO did not want to go that route.139 Although 
the court agreed with EPA that it did not have to rely on the 
company’s own unenforceable estimates of future emissions, it was 
nevertheless inappropriate for EPA to assume that the plant would be 
operating full-time at maximum capacity in calculating post-
renovation emissions.140  The court therefore set aside EPA’s 
determination that the WEPCO project would increase emissions for 
purposes of the PSD program.141 
B.  Response to WEPCO 
The electric power industry reacted to the rather disappointing 
WEPCO holding in two ways.  First, recognizing that WEPCO had 
gotten into trouble when the state environmental agency had sought 
advice from EPA, companies rarely sought applicability 
determinations from EPA after WEPCO.142  Second, the industry 
sought relief from Congress, which was at that moment deliberating 
over major amendments to the Clean Air Act offered by the George 
H.W. Bush administration.  The latter effort failed when changes 
offered at the last minute by the administration failed to make it into 
the final version of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.143  Instead, 
the conference committee report urged EPA to revise its NSR 
regulations to ensure that they were not inconsistent with WEPCO and 
the new amendments to the statute.144 
When industry lobbyists learned that the administration had 
begun to deliberate over changes to the NSR regulations, the head of 
the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”) wrote to a friend in the 
Department of Energy (“DOE”) to solicit his aid in securing “a good 
                                                        
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 917. 
 141.  Id. at 918. 
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WEPCO fix.”145  The letter provided several specific proposals for 
revising the NSR regulations.146  Within days, DOE’s Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Fossil Energy wrote to EPA to complain that the current 
draft of EPA’s proposed regulation was “not responsive to the needs 
of the electric utility industry” and to demand “a good and 
comprehensive WEPCO fix.”147  Unwilling to trust EPA to draft an 
acceptable proposal, DOE drafted its own proposal that included 
EEI’s proposed changes.148  High-level officials in EPA promptly 
revised the proposal, but the revision was still unacceptable to DOE.149  
Once again, EPA acquiesced.150  Representative Henry Waxman later 
criticized the EPA’s political appointees for excluding “EPA staffers 
who spent years on this issue” while allowing the rulemaking process 
to be “taken over by DOE officials who kn[e]w only what the electric 
utilities t[old] them.”151 
In June 1991, EPA proposed a “WEPCO Rule”152 that would have 
amended the NSR regulations in three significant ways.  First, the 
agency proposed to amend the definition of “major modification[]” 
for PSD areas to exclude “pollution control projects” that did not 
render the relevant unit “less environmentally beneficial” on the 
theory that they were not “physical or operational changes.”153  
Second, the agency proposed to clarify the methodology for 
calculating baseline level of actual emissions to create a presumption 
that “any 2 consecutive years within the 5 years prior to the proposed 
change” would be “representative of normal source operations for a 
utility.”154  This methodology would ensure that emissions increases 
and reductions at other units in the facility were contemporaneous 
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with any emissions increases from the changed unit for netting 
purposes.155  Third, the agency responded to the WEPCO remand by 
replacing the actual-to-potential emissions test for determining 
whether there was a net increase in emissions with an “actual-to-
future-actual” test for all changes other than the construction of a new 
unit or replacement of an existing unit.156  In calculating future actual 
emissions, the source could use projected utilization of the source 
during the two years after the change or any other representative two-
year period within the ten years following the change.157  It could also 
take into account factors, such as “system-wide demand growth,” that 
“would have occurred and affected the unit’s operations even in the 
absence of the physical or operational change.”158  The agency 
reasoned that increases in emissions attributable to such independent 
factors were not caused by the physical change because they would 
have occurred anyway.159 The final rule that the agency published on 
July 1, 1992 did not differ in any significant way from the proposal.160 
Although the WEPCO Rule created even more gray areas for 
minimal compliers to exploit, EPA continued to leave the NSR 
application determination to the utility companies undertaking 
changes without requiring that they inform the permitting authorities 
of those determinations.161  It did, however, agree to continue its 
practice of providing applicability determinations to companies that 
asked for them.162  Although the regulations did not address the 
RMRR exemption, the preamble contained language that bore 
directly on subsequent judicial interpretations of that exemption.  
The preamble “clarif[ied]” that the determination of whether the 
                                                        
 155.  Id.  The agency also proposed to amend its NSPS regulations to allow a source to 
use as “its pre-change baseline its highest hourly emissions rate achievable during the 5 
years prior to the proposed physical or operational change.”  Id. at 27,631. 
 156.  1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,323.  The agency reasoned 
that since there was no relevant operating history for wholly new units and replaced units, 
it would not be possible “to reasonably project post-change utilization for these units, and 
hence, their future level of ‘representative annual actual emissions.’”  Id.  For other 
changes, past operating history and other relevant information could provide a basis for 
reasonable projections.  Id. 
 157.  EPA WEPCO Rule, supra note 152, at 27,637.  The actual-to-future-actual test 
would not, however, apply to greenfield units at existing plants or to “reconstructed” units 
for which the capital cost exceeded fifty percent of the replacement cost, because there 
would be no experience upon which to base projections of future utilization.  Id. at 27,636; 
40 C.F.R. § 60.15(b)(1) (2012). 
 158.  EPA WEPCO Rule, supra note 152, at 27,637. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34. 
 161.  Id. at 32,332. 
 162.  Id. 
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repair or replacement of a particular item of equipment is “routine” 
under the NSR regulations, while made on a case-by-case basis, should 
be based on the source operator’s evaluation of whether that type of 
equipment had been repaired or replaced by sources within the 
relevant industrial category in the past.163 
C.  NSR Simplification Proposals 
Deterrence-based enforcement had a brief resurgence at the 
outset of the Clinton administration,164 but EPA’s focus shifted to 
assistance as the agency navigated the minefield of the 104th 
Congress.165  There was very little action on the regulatory front 
during President Clinton’s first term.  An EPA-assembled advisory 
group consisting of representatives from state agencies and industry 
and environmental groups struggled with little success to come up 
with additional changes to the NSR program that would be acceptable 
to all of the diverse interests.166  On July 23, 1996, EPA published a 
proposed “NSR Simplification” rule that would have extended the 
WEPCO Rule’s changes from the electric utility industry to other 
industries.167  In addition, the proposal would have created a new 
exclusion for “clean unit[s],” which it defined as units that had 
installed technologies meeting the BACT or LAER tests within the 
past ten years.168  Finally, the proposal would have allowed sources to 
use plantwide applicability limits (“PALs”) to avoid NSR if they could 
offset emissions from the project under consideration with emissions 
reductions from any other unit in the entire plant, not just those 
affected by the project.169  After state agencies and environmental 
                                                        
 163.  Id. at 32,326. 
 164.  See DOJ to Focus on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, Top Official Says, 24 
ENV’T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1140 (Oct. 15, 1993) (“The new leadership at DOJ is . . . in-
creasingly emphasiz[ing] criminal enforcement of environmental laws . . . .”); One-Fifth of 
Facilities Surveyed by Group Found to be in “Serious” Violation of Act, 24 ENV’T REP. CUR. DEV. 
(BNA) 733 (Aug. 20, 1993) (noting that the fines EPA assessed for violations of the Clean 
Water Act increased from $5–6 million in the late 1980s to $22 million in 1992). 
 165.  Andreen, supra note 89, at 73; Mintz, supra note 36, at 10,502. 
 166.  David A. Golden, The Need to Reform NSR Reform, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 170, 
171 (1997); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-947, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD USE 
AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
PROGRAM 7 (August 2003) [hereinafter GAO, AVAILABLE DATA]; Bruce Barcott, Changing 
All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, at 38. 
 167.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source 
Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250 (July 23, 1996). 
 168.  Id. at 38,255. 
 169.  Barcott, supra note 166, at 38; Proposed Changes to New Source Program Could Narrow 
Applicability of Current Rules, 27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 621 (July 26, 1996). 
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groups strongly objected to the changes, the agency put the proposal 
on the back burner.170 
In July 1998, the agency issued another notice of proposed 
rulemaking soliciting comment on one aspect of the actual-to-future-
actual methodology and on a particular approach to PALs that was 
not clearly specified in the earlier proposal.171  To the utility industry’s 
chagrin, however, the proposal announced that the agency was having 
second thoughts on whether it should allow sources to discount 
emissions attributable to future demand in calculating actual-to-
future-actual emissions.172  In addition to proposing to disallow the 
“demand growth” exemption for other industries, the agency was now 
proposing to repeal the “demand growth” provision in the WEPCO 
Rule.173  The EPA explained that in the increasingly competitive 
environment of the deregulated marketplace, demand projections 
were less dependable and incentives to cut corners were much 
higher.174  The agency also expressed concern that utility companies 
were not filing the reports required by the WEPCO Rule detailing 
actual emissions for five years following the change.175  Minimal 
compliers had apparently been exploiting the vagueness in the 
regulations to avoid both NSR and their reporting obligations.176  This 
time the affected industries objected strongly to the proposal, and the 
agency returned to the drawing board.177 
IV.  THE DOJ/EPA NSR ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE DURING THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 
A.  Preparing a Deterrence-Based Enforcement Initiative 
While EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation (“OAR”) spent the 
entire Clinton administration attempting to draft an NSR reform 
proposal on which all affected parties could agree, the agency’s 
                                                        
 170.  NSR Proposal Supported by Industry; States, Environmental Groups Cite Harm, 27 ENV’T 
REP. (BNA) 1139 (Sept. 20, 1996). 
 171.  Notice of Availability, supra note42. 
 172.  Id. at 39,860. 
 173.  Notice of Availability, supra note 42, at 39,860. 
 174.  Id.; Alec Zacaroli, NSR Measures to be Coordinated, Scheduled for Promulgation by May 
1999, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 406 (June 19, 1998). 
 175.  Notice of Availability, supra note 42, at 39,860. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Alec Zacaroli, Utilities Contend Proposed Changes to NSR Would Jeopardize Efficiency; 
EPA Disagrees, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1230 (Oct. 23, 1998); Alec Zacaroli, Latest Attempt to 
Rewrite Regulations Draws Objections from States, Industry, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1190 (Oct. 16, 
1998). 
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enforcement office was building strong cases for prosecuting dozens 
of companies for violating the regulations that were already on the 
books.  By the mid-1990s, EPA enforcers were puzzling over economic 
data suggesting that production had increased in several sectors of 
the economy that were not experiencing much in the way of new 
construction.178  In the electrical power generation sector, for 
example, there was very little new plant construction, but coal 
consumption and electricity generation were increasing primarily due 
to the efforts of utility companies to “optimize performance of 
existing coal-fired facilities despite their increasing age.”179  In a classic 
example of minimal compliance, utility companies found it cheaper 
to keep the grandfathered plants running through life extension 
projects than to invest in new capacity.180  The Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance (“OECA”) decided to launch a major 
deterrence-based enforcement initiative aimed at the electric utility 
industry and three other industries. 
Preparing an enforcement case against a major utility company 
was no easy task.  First, EPA had to obtain information about the 
projects that the target company had completed during the relevant 
time period.  EPA could obtain a great deal of relevant information by 
submitting information requests under section 114 of the Clean Air 
Act.181  The responses to these requests could fill dozens of banker’s 
boxes, and it could take the agency staff a long time to wade through 
the documents and separate the wheat from the chaff.  After that, the 
agency could send a team of investigators to the plant to conduct a 
physical inspection of the operations and on-site records.182  If these 
two steps yielded sufficient information to support a conclusion that 
the source had undertaken a major modification without undergoing 
NSR, the agency would typically present that information to the 
company and initiate settlement negotiations.  If the negotiations 
stalled, EPA enforcement officials would prepare a file to refer to DOJ 
attorneys, who would review the file and decide whether it merited 
further prosecution.  If DOJ decided to proceed with the case, it 
                                                        
 178.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1692–93; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 04-
58, CLEAN AIR ACT: NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS COULD AFFECT UTILITY ENFORCEMENT 
CASES AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO EMISSIONS DATA 10 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter GAO, NEW 
SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS]. 
 179.  PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 5–6; see also Buckheit Testimony, supra note 
84, at 3. 
 180.  Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 607 (statement of John Walke, NRDC); 
PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 6. 
 181.  42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1) (2006). 
 182.  Id. § 7414(a)(2). 
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would typically initiate another round of settlement negotiations 
before filing the case in a federal district court.183  This cumbersome 
process could take years to complete. 
An internal OECA memorandum outlined a strategy for a major 
enforcement initiative aimed at public utility companies.  The office 
planned to “investigate this industry in a way quite different from 
earlier, more traditional inspections” by focusing its inquiry on “only a 
few issues and pollutants and expending considerable initial effort on 
understanding this industry so as to be better equipped to identify 
and recognize less-than-obvious changes/modifications that may have 
been made.”184  The office would then “develop a list of possible 
changes on which it would focus its inspections.”185  Next, it would 
conduct inspections, demand information, and, if necessary, “depose 
key plant personnel” at around twenty-five power plants.186  OECA was 
“prepared to take enforcement action for noncompliance attributable 
to triggering events that occurred since 1977” and to demand the 
installation of technologies determined to be BACT and LAER at the 
time the changes were made.187 
The agency followed up on the memorandum by sending more 
than 100 investigators to more than thirty power plants.188  The 
investigations revealed that many of the nation’s largest power 
companies had engaged in significant renovations without 
undergoing NSR.189  In many cases the companies’ own accounting 
books revealed major improvement projects that could not possibly 
have avoided increases in emissions that should have subjected them 
to NSR.190  The head of the air enforcement office concluded that 
“‘[c]ompanies understood what was going on, and a lot of them 
                                                        
 183.  See GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 18. 
 184.  Alec Zacaroli, Agency Request for Data on Boilermakers Prompts Alarm Among Coal-Fired 
Utilities, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 638 (July 24, 1998) [hereinafter Zacaroli, Alarm]. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Alec Zacaroli, Utility Group Asks OMB to Halt Efforts to Gather Data on Boiler Modifica-
tion, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 833 (Aug. 21, 1998); Zacaroli, Alarm, supra note 184. 
 187.  Zacaroli, Alarm, supra note 184. 
 188.  N.Y. to Sue Midwest Plant Owners over Pollution, GENERATION WK., Sept. 22, 1999, at 
1 [hereinafter N.Y. to Sue]. 
 189.  ROBERT S. DEVINE, BUSH VS. THE ENVIRONMENT 134–35 (2004); OFFICE OF LEGAL 
POLICY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW SOURCE REVIEW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSISTENCY OF 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS WITH THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, 
JANUARY 2002 [hereinafter OLP ANALYSIS], reprinted in Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra 
note 75, at 108. 
 190.  Barcott, supra note 166. 
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thought they could evade the law.’”191  It was, in her view, “the most 
significant noncompliance pattern E.P.A. had ever found.”192  A 
vigorous deterrence-based enforcement effort could bring about 
widespread adoption of state-of-the-art control technologies capable 
of reducing emissions by eighty-five to ninety-five percent.193  If the 
rule writers in OAR could not achieve closure on NSR simplification 
reforms, perhaps OECA could achieve some useful clarification 
through the litigation process.194 
On November 17, 1998, Eric V. Schaeffer, the head of the 
regulatory enforcement division, issued a guidance document setting 
out the agency’s policies for seeking injunctive relief in settling NSR 
cases.195  The purpose of the memorandum was to prevent minimal 
compliers from gaining a competitive advantage by gaming the 
system.196  The memo required EPA enforcement officials to insist at a 
minimum that the sources install control technology or agree to 
process changes that would result in emissions reductions equivalent 
to BACT or LAER.197  In addition, companies should ordinarily not be 
allowed to dismantle the project or submit to an emissions cap or 
limit on hours of operation in order to avoid installing BACT or 
LAER once EPA had filed an enforcement action against it.198 
EPA was not the only enforcement authority investigating NSR 
violations by the electric utility industry.  Like EPA, the State of New 
York and several environmental groups had sent investigators to Ohio 
to examine documents at the state public utility commission and the 
state environmental agency.199  In September 1999, New York Attorney 
                                                        
 191.  Id. (quoting Sylvia Lowrance, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 9; Barcott, supra note 166. 
 194.  See Christopher W. Armstrong, EPA’s New Source Review Enforcement Initiatives, 14 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 203, 203 (2000) (“The goal of these initiatives is to obtain civil 
penalties and, more importantly, new emission controls which EPA has been unable thus 
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Juni, Has EPA Fired up Utilities to Clear the Air?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 8–9 (2000) 
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 195.  Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforce-
ment, Guidance on the Appropriate Injunctive Relief for Violations of Major New Source 
Review Requirements (Nov. 17, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/nsr/ 
nsrmemos/nsrguida.pdf. 
 196.  Id. at 2. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 3. 
 199.  Pamela Najor, Environmental Groups to Sue Utility over Air Act Violations, 30 ENV’T 
REP. (BNA) 1173 (Oct. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Najor, Air Act Violations]; N.Y. to Sue, supra 
note 188. 
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General Eliot Spitzer sent “60-day notices” to the owners of seventeen 
power plants in five Midwestern states informing them that New York 
planned to sue them under the Clean Air Act’s citizen enforcement 
provisions for violating the statute’s NSR requirements.200  Soon 
thereafter, several national and local environmental groups sent a 
letter notifying American Electric Power that they were planning to 
sue it for failures by eleven of its plants in five states to comply with 
the NSR requirements.201  Because the statute allows EPA to assume 
the lead role if it files a lawsuit within sixty days202 of the notices of 
intent, the notices prodded EPA into action.203 
B.  Filling Enforcement Actions 
After almost two years of intense investigations and analyses of 
industry documents, public utility submissions, employee testimony, 
and the like,204 EPA sent a large number of referrals to DOJ for 
prosecution.205  DOJ attorneys reviewed EPA’s submissions, prepared 
legal memoranda to support proposed allegations, hired independent 
experts to provide testimony in upcoming trials, and met with 
company lawyers in an attempt to settle the cases in advance of filing 
them.206  On November 3, 1999, DOJ filed lawsuits against seven large 
power companies representing thirty percent of the coal-fired 
electrical generating capacity in the United States alleging that they 
had engaged in major modifications without undergoing NSR at 
more than twenty-five power plants.207  The complaints sought both 
monetary penalties of up to $27,000 per day and injunctive relief 
                                                        
 200.  Richard Perez-Pena, Possible Federal Pullout Clouds Northeast States’ Pollution Suits, 
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2000). 
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requiring companies to install controls equivalent to current BACT or 
LAER, depending on the plant’s location.208  At the same time, EPA 
filed an administrative enforcement action against the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (“TVA”) making similar allegations.209  In December 
2000, DOJ sued Duke Energy Co., one of the country’s largest utility 
companies, accusing it of violating the NSR requirements at all eight 
of its power plants.210  The states and environmental groups that had 
filed the earlier actions joined EPA in all of the lawsuits.211  It was the 
largest enforcement effort EPA had ever launched.212 
The modifications at issue fell into four general categories: (1) 
construction of new power generating units without seeking a permit; 
(2) capacity expansion projects that increased the hourly generating 
capacity of the affected units; (3) redesign of units after installation in 
ways that eliminated or mitigated original design defects; and (4) life 
extension projects that extended the useful life of boilers beyond that 
contemplated when the plants were originally built.213  The agency 
argued that these projects were clearly physical changes that 
increased net emissions, even under the liberal definitions of the 
WEPCO Rule, and that they were not covered by the RMMR 
exception because they were too extensive, too costly, and too 
infrequently undertaken.214  The industry responded that the activities 
targeted by EPA enforcers were meant merely to “refurbish or 
                                                        
 208.  Jaber, supra note 53, at 23; OLP ANALYSIS, supra note 189, reprinted in Senate NSR 
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 211.  Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 99 (statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Environment & Natural Resources Division, DOJ). 
 212.  John H. Stam, Clinton’s Big Enforcement Initiative Poses Major Challenge for Bush Team, 
Lawyer Says, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 293 (Feb. 16, 2001). 
 213.  NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 10; Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 
1693–94. 
 214.  Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1693. 
  
1234 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1204 
maintain and improve the reliability and efficiency” of their facilities 
and were therefore not “major modifications.”215 
C.  Responding to the Enforcement Actions 
The electric utility industry responded to the lawsuits in two 
forums.  In the courts, the individual companies played a defensive 
game, responding to EPA’s accusations with highly technical legal 
arguments designed to persuade the judges to dismiss the cases.216  In 
the halls of the White House, Congress, and state regulatory agencies, 
industry lobbyists seized the offensive with a number of strategies 
designed to bring a halt to the government’s enforcement initiative 
before the courts could rule on the merits of the claims.217  The 
amount of money at stake was so high (billions of dollars in potential 
fines and pollution control costs) that the companies invested 
substantial sums in both efforts.218  In the meantime, they kept up 
their efforts to optimize output and extend the lives of their older 
plants.219 
1.  Notice 
The industry raised a host of objections to EPA’s enforcement 
actions in both forums.  The most frequently raised argument was 
that EPA was unfairly changing the rules in the middle of the game 
and had failed to give regulatees fair notice of its radical new 
interpretations of the regulations.220  Companies had been 
                                                        
 215.  Jaber, supra note 53, at 23. 
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2013] NEW SOURCE REVIEW ENFORCEMENT 1235 
undertaking major efficiency-enhancing and life-extending projects 
for twenty years, they argued, without EPA voicing serious 
objections.221  The agency had therefore “tacitly accepted” the 
industry’s interpretation of the rules by “not objecting to state 
nonapplicability determinations and permits.”222  Industry 
representatives maintained that companies had been asking EPA for 
guidance on how to meet the NSR requirements, but the “guidance 
never came.”223  EPA, they claimed, was therefore estopped from 
claiming that activities undertaken pursuant to those interpretations 
violated the regulations.224 
EPA, environmental groups, and the downwind states had a 
number of responses.225   EPA maintained that the agency had not 
changed its interpretation of the rules, but had merely stepped up its 
enforcement of those rules in light of new information showing that 
they were routinely being violated.226  The agency had in fact issued 
numerous letters, guidance documents, and applicability 
determinations that should have made the industry well aware of 
EPA’s positions on the issues.227  Moreover, WEPCO, which was 
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(BNA) 1399 (July 20, 2001) (quoting Carol Holmes, attorney, EPA & Steven Barhite, engi-
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initiated in 1988, put the industry on notice that EPA was strictly 
interpreting the RMRR exemption, and it ratified the agency’s 
reliance on five factors—the “nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and 
cost of the work”—in making case-by-case applicability 
determinations.228  If a company wanted further guidance, all it had to 
do was ask EPA for an applicability determination.229  In fact, very few 
companies after WEPCO asked EPA for applicability determinations 
because they preferred to determine the applicability of NSR to 
particular projects on their own.230  Despite fair warning, EPA and the 
states argued, the minimal compliers in the industry had pressed 
ahead with unreasonable interpretations of the NSR rules to avoid the 
cost of complying with the law.231 
That response was supported by documents and testimony that 
emerged during the litigation.  Long before the Seventh Circuit 
issued its WEPCO decision, the Utility Air Regulatory Group 
(“UARG”), an industry trade association devoted exclusively to 
regulatory issues, made its members aware of EPA’s 1988 applicability 
determination regarding the WEPCO facility.  A UARG memorandum 
advised readers that in order to qualify for the RMRR exemption, a 
project had to be “frequent, inexpensive, able to be accomplished at a 
scheduled outage, [could] not extend the normal economic life of 
the unit, [and] be of standard industry design.”232  At conferences 
sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (“EPRI”) dating 
back to the mid-1980s, participants recognized that “life extension 
projects” would be needed to meet rising demand by plants that 
                                                        
bility determinations); Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 74 (statement of Eric 
Schaeffer, Environmental Integrity Project) (emphasizing EPA’s consistent guidance); 
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226 (quoting EPA engineer Steven Barhite as stating that “[g]uidance letters and respons-
es from EPA” were common).  But see Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221 (stating that EPA 
has provided “scarce, if any, guidance or input” since the NSR requirements were first 
promulgated). 
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Hearings, supra note 75, at 64 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y. Gen., New York). 
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[hereinafter Senate Public Health Hearings] (statement of Eric V. Schaeffer, Former Direc-
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 232.  Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 175 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y 
Gen., New York) (quoting the UARG document). 
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exceeded their thirty-year designed lifetimes and that this required “a 
different approach than routine maintenance.”233  At a 1984 EPRI 
workshop, participants were advised that since “[s]ome aspects of life 
extension projects may not be considered routine 
repair/maintenance/replacement,” companies should identify such 
projects as “upgraded maintenance programs.”234  They were also 
advised to review their accounting practices because they “play a 
significant role here.”235 
A report prepared by DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded 
that EPA had “a reasonable argument under existing law that 
enforcement of the new source review provisions in these cases [did] 
not amount to an interpretation of the regulations that depart[ed] 
from a prior authoritative interpretation.”236  More important, the 
courts were not at all receptive to the industry’s notice argument.237  
For example, in United States v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. 
(SIGECO),238 the court concluded that SIGECO could have known 
with “ascertainable certainty” how EPA interpreted the term “routine” 
in the context of life extension projects.239 
2.  Complexity 
The industry argued that the rules were far too complex to be 
comprehensible.240  EPA had issued far too many complicated 
guidance documents, memos, letters and the like, some of which were 
inconsistent with each other.241  Because the permitting authorities 
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 238.  245 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. 2003). 
 239.  S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. 
 240.  GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 14; Bebe Raupe, EPA Program Too 
Complex, Unfair, Witnesses Tell Senate Field Hearing, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 373 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
 241.  See Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 85 (statement of Donald Elliott, Co-
Chair, Environmental Practice Group, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker) (“EPA’s many 
changing interpretations of NSR over the years have created a legal mess of baffling com-
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determined whether NSR applied to projects on a case-by-case basis, it 
was difficult for companies to know in advance whether any of the 
many repair and renovation projects they undertook at their facilities 
would subject the affected units to NSR.242 
EPA responded that the complexity of the regulations and the 
proliferation of guidance documents stemmed from the fact that the 
rules had to cover “over 20,000 diverse factories and power plants with 
an almost infinite number of fact patterns.”243  They pointed out that 
the companies that were targets of the enforcement actions were not 
mom-and-pop companies with limited resources to spend on 
ascertaining the meaning of the applicable regulations.  Instead, they 
were huge companies with a sophisticated trade association and 
access to high quality legal advice.244  To a large degree, the 
complexity was attributable to minimal compliers in the industry who 
had “lobbied EPA for exemptions, special rulings and interpretations 
to address perceived or real inequities or policy goals.”245 
3.  RMRR Exemption 
The companies argued that many of the changes at issue were 
covered by the “routine maintenance, repair and replacement” 
(“RMRR”) exemption.246  That they might also extend the life of the 
plants was fortuitous.247  Because it was very difficult to store electricity 
for use in emergencies when equipment malfunctioned, it was 
essential for utility companies to keep all of their generating units in 
operating order at all times, and this required constant 
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16, at 13. 
 244.  Senate Public Health Hearings, supra note 229, at 35 (statement of Eric V. Schaeffer). 
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[hereinafter EPA NSR REPORT]; PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 16. 
 247.  PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 16. 
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maintenance.248  At the same time, power plants operated under 
conditions of extreme temperature and pressure where parts wear out 
at different rates and must be replaced periodically to ensure against 
unanticipated operational failures.249  If minor projects could trigger 
NSR, then every power plant would fall within its ambit.250 
EPA took the position that the RMRR exemption was applicable 
only to minor maintenance activities engaged in on a regular basis.251  
The projects that the DOJ/EPA lawsuits had targeted, by contrast, 
were major projects that required very large capital expenditures and 
were undertaken infrequently, if ever, at the targeted plants.252  They 
often caused the relevant units to be removed from service for periods 
much longer than typical maintenance shutdowns,253 and they 
sometimes involved years of planning in company departments that 
were not responsible for maintenance.254  In many cases, companies 
had redesigned the replacement component to increase capacity, 
regain lost capacity, or extend the lifetime of the unit.255 
In the many cases in which the plant had never undertaken a 
project like the one at issue, the company typically argued that other 
companies had engaged in such projects on a regular basis and that 
the regulations required EPA to adopt an “industry-wide” approach to 
defining “routine.”256  EPA was unwilling to accept the “everyone is 
doing it” defense.  It took the position that EPA could properly look 
to the company’s own past practices as well as industry experience in 
making the “routineness” determination.257  The district court in 
SIGECO agreed that EPA was reasonable to focus its “frequency” 
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inquiry on the specific unit at issue, and not on the frequency of 
similar projects throughout the industry.258 
4.  Hourly Emissions 
As we have seen, the emissions rate adopted by the regulations 
for new source performance standards (kilograms per hour) differed 
from the rate adopted in the NSR regulations for PSD and 
nonattainment areas (tons per year) because the 1977 amendments 
employed the latter measure in defining major stationary sources.259  
EPA, state attorneys general, and environmental groups took the 
position that it was entirely appropriate to define modification 
differently in the two programs given the historical context.260  The 
industry argued that EPA could not interpret the word “modification” 
to mean one thing in the NSPS program and another in the PSD and 
nonattainment program.261 
The difference mattered.  The RMRR regulations excluded 
emissions increases due exclusively to an increase in operating hours 
or production rate at a facility that had undergone no physical or 
operational change; they did not speak to increases in emissions 
attributable to an increase in hours of operation or production rate 
that resulted from a construction activity.262  The Supreme Court of 
the United States ultimately held that the agency could find that a 
physical or operational change that increased hours of operation and 
thereby increased emissions subjected the source to NSR.263 
5.  Statute of Limitations 
A far more successful claim for the industry was that actions 
based upon projects completed long ago were barred by the general 
five-year statute of limitations for federal enforcement actions.264  EPA 
responded that it took so long to file the lawsuits because the 
evidence that the sources had violated the law was hidden in industry 
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financial files and was therefore not easily accessible to agency 
inspectors.265  Because owners were not required to notify EPA or a 
state permitting authority before beginning a project that might 
trigger the NSR requirement, the agency did not even know that the 
project was initiated much less whether it should have triggered 
NSR.266  The courts were not especially sympathetic to EPA’s reasons 
for belated filings.  Several courts held that the statute of limitations 
barred claims for civil penalties involving projects that had been 
completed more than five years prior to the action.267  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, held that the violations were 
of a continuing nature and the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run until they were corrected.268  Since the statute of limitations refers 
only to monetary damages, some courts allowed claims for injunctive 
relief to proceed.269 
D.  Litigation End Runs 
The electric utility industry also developed strategies for avoiding 
the DOJ/EPA lawsuits.  One strategy was to strike a sweetheart 
settlement deal with a state agency before the federal lawsuit was 
filed.270  Soon after EPA sued Tampa Electric Company (“TECO”), for 
example, the company entered into a settlement agreement under 
which it agreed to decrease emissions over a ten-year period by 
converting its largest plant from coal to natural gas and using high-
efficiency technologies to control emissions at its other plants.271  
Although EPA and DOJ strongly objected to the Florida settlement 
when it was announced,272 the strategy appeared to work as the federal 
government ultimately settled its claims against TECO on terms very 
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similar to the Florida arrangement except for the addition of a $3.5 
million fine and specific milestones over the ten-year period.273 
Utility industry lobbyists also sought to undermine EPA’s 
enforcement initiative by persuading sympathetic members of 
Congress to attach a rider to a pending appropriations bill during the 
waning days of the 106th Congress to allow companies to continue 
their past optimization and life extension practices while the litigation 
was pending.274  In a November 10, 1999 letter to several of its allies, 
the Edison Electric Institute and several other industry organizations 
warned that the enforcement action had “effectively paralyzed the 
electric utility industry’s repair and maintenance programs” with 
potentially “severe implications for supply reliability in the near 
future.”275  The move failed, however, when the chairman of the 
House Appropriations Committee objected that it was another one of 
the special interest riders that he had been struggling to keep out of 
the bill.276 
E.  Preparing New Cases 
The EPA/DOJ enforcement initiative continued unabated for 
the remainder of the Clinton administration.  Predicting that a 
George W. Bush administration would rein in EPA enforcement, the 
head of regulatory enforcement at EPA pushed his staff to build as 
many case files as possible for referral to DOJ.277  Working fourteen-
hour days, the staff referred violations at twelve more power plants 
owned by the original defendants to DOJ for prosecution.278  In 
addition, EPA investigators sent demands for information to twenty-
five to thirty companies that were not included in the original 
lawsuits.279 
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F.  Settlements 
Many of the defendants were anxious to settle the cases on terms 
quite favorable to the government.280  By the end of the Clinton 
administration, EPA had reached settlement agreements with owners 
of one-third of the country’s refining capacity in which they agreed to 
pay hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties and to install modern 
pollution-control technologies.281  Electric utility companies were 
more inclined to force EPA to prove that they had violated the NSR 
regulations at trial.282  By the end of the Clinton administration, EPA 
had reached only one settlement with a major utility company.283  The 
government reached agreements in principal with Cinergy Corp. and 
Dominion Corp., under which Cinergy agreed to spend $1.4 billion 
and Dominion agreed to spend $2.3 billion for pollution-reduction 
upgrades and both companies agreed to pay a total of almost $69 
million in civil penalties and supplemental environmental projects.284  
Neither agreement was finalized, however, before the Bush 
administration radically changed the direction of EPA’s policies 
regarding NSR. 
V.  THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION REWRITES THE RULES 
At the outset of the George W. Bush administration, it appeared 
that the comfortable unregulated world that grandfathered power 
plants inhabited was about to undergo dramatic change as DOJ and 
EPA pressed forward with their aggressive deterrence-based 
enforcement agenda.  The agencies had sued thirty-four power plants, 
entered into one major settlement, and were on the verge of settling 
two other actions.285  Many of the original defendants were in serious 
settlement negotiations, and EPA was in similar negotiations with sixty 
facilities that had already received notices of violation but had not yet 
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been sued.286  At the same time, EPA was busily investigating more 
than 100 facilities for potential NSR violations.287 
Yet, just as the litigation was on the verge of bringing about 
major upgrades at grandfathered plants, the George W. Bush 
administration launched major legislative and administrative 
initiatives to change the rules in ways that would ensure that aging 
power plants could continue to emit pollutants at the same rates that 
they were emitting in the 1970s.288  The message that the litigation 
defendants received was that they should prolong their lawsuits until 
the Bush administration or Congress put less restrictive requirements 
in place, and then ask the judge to dismiss the cases on the ground 
that the agency no longer adhered to its former interpretation of the 
rules.  Not surprisingly, many public utility companies adopted a 
strategy of resistance and delay that put off the day of reckoning for 
many years. 
During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush 
projected the image of a pro-business conservative with a rather 
benign view of the environment.289  His running mate, Dick Cheney, 
by contrast, had no use for environmentalists and was disinclined to 
compromise with people who did not share his views about the need 
to dramatically expand the nation’s energy resources.290  When the 
Supreme Court declared the Bush/Cheney ticket to be the winners of 
the closely contested election, the electric utility and coal industries 
were pleased.291  President Bush appointed New Jersey governor 
Christie Todd Whitman, a pro-business Republican moderate who 
had been an outspoken proponent of the NSR lawsuits, to be 
Administrator of EPA.292  He appointed Jeffrey Holmstead, a 
lawyer/lobbyist for an electric utility trade group, to be the Assistant 
Administrator for Air and Radiation.293  As it turned out, however, the 
locus of power on environmental issues in the Bush administration 
was in the Office of the Vice President.294 
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A.  Industry Demands Relief 
Well aware of the fact that many NSR enforcement lawsuits had 
been filed during the last two years of the Clinton administration and 
that many more cases were in the queue,295 industry groups that had 
contributed heavily to the Bush presidential campaign began to exert 
pressure at the highest levels.296  The industries affected by NSR spent 
millions of dollars on a massive lobbying campaign headed by former 
Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour and 
former Montana governor Marc Racicot.297  The president of the 
Edison Electric Institute, a college classmate of the president who had 
raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for his campaign, met three 
times with Deputy Energy Secretary Francis S. Blake to press the 
industry’s case.298  On the enforcement front, the stakeholder 
negotiations over NSR reforms that had been going on since the 
WEPCO decision were suddenly terminated by the industry 
participants who concluded that they could get a better deal by 
appealing directly to the White House.299 
Though vastly outgunned, environmental groups did what they 
could to keep the enforcement initiative alive.  The threat that rolling 
back the NSR regulations would pose to the ongoing litigation was a 
dominant theme in environmental group opposition to all of EPA’s 
NSR rulemaking initiatives.300  They attempted to seize the offensive 
with a major publicity campaign, replete with media events, 
advertising and internet organizing, to force the Southern Company, 
one of the country’s largest emitters of SO2 and NOx and a target of 
EPA’s enforcement initiative, to close some of its ancient coal-fired 
power plants and to reduce emissions dramatically from the others.301 
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B.  The Cheney Task Force Report 
The Bush administration was quite receptive to the industry 
overtures.  Nine days after the inauguration, President Bush asked 
Vice President Cheney to chair a task force of high-level government 
officials to recommend a national energy policy.302  During the task 
force’s deliberations, an aide to Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham 
sent an email to energy company executives asking what they would 
do to meet the nation’s energy needs if they were “King, or Il 
Duce.”303  Several of the respondents put NSR reform at or near the 
top of their lists.304  The executives promised that halting the lawsuits 
would increase electricity generation more quickly than any other 
suggestion on the task force’s agenda.305  Senators John Breaux (D-
Louisiana) and James Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) wrote to Cheney to urge 
him to suspend the ongoing lawsuits pending a full investigation of 
EPA’s NSR policies and their impact on electricity and fuel supplies.306 
Although EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman was a 
member of the task force, EPA officials did not have the same degree 
of access to the task force’s behind-the-scenes deliberations as some of 
the other participants.  When Associate Administrator Tom Gibson 
attempted to correct inaccurate language and erroneous assumptions 
in a draft of the report, his input was ignored.307  Two weeks before 
the task force’s report was published, Whitman wrote a memorandum 
to Cheney noting that the real issue for the industry was the 
enforcement cases, and warning that the ongoing settlement 
negotiations with the defendants in those cases would “likely slow 
down or stop.”308  She advised Cheney that the administration would 
“pay a terrible political price if [it] undercut or walk[ed] away from” 
the enforcement cases.309 Whitman’s overtures, however, were no 
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match for a “parade of industry groups—including the CEOs of major 
electric utilities” that met with Cheney and other members of the task 
force to complain about the lawsuits.310 
The task force’s report, published in May 2001, projected the 
energy industry’s message that environmental regulations had unduly 
constrained the nation’s ability to modernize its energy 
infrastructure.311  The report recommended that the president direct 
EPA, in consultation with DOE and other agencies, to “review [NSR] 
regulations, including administrative interpretation and 
implementation, and report to the President within 90 days on the 
impact of the regulations on investment in new utility and refinery 
generation capacity, energy efficiency, and environmental 
protection.”312  It also recommended that the president direct DOJ “to 
review existing enforcement actions regarding NSR to ensure that the 
enforcement actions are consistent with the Clean Air Act and its 
regulations.”313  On the legislative front, the task force recommended 
that the president direct EPA to propose “multi-pollutant legislation” 
that would “establish a flexible, market-based program to significantly 
reduce and cap emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
mercury from electric power generators.”314 
                                                        
 310.  Michael Isikoff, A Plot to Foil the Greens, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 2001, at 36; see also Drew 
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at power plants,” had had a “direct and chilling effect on all maintenance and efficiency 
improvements and clean coal technology installations at existing power plants.”  Id.  A sub-
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was defending two companies in the EPA/DOJ litigation and that it was rushed into draft 
form in order to be useful to the Vice President’s Energy Task Force.  Steve Cook, Refining 
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The industry response to the task force report was quite positive.  
A spokesperson for EEI said that it was “very encouraged the new 
source review program is receiving considerable attention from the 
administration and the energy task force.”315  Asked about the report’s 
impact on the pending settlement negotiations in the NSR cases, he 
expressed the view that “it would make sense for them to wait and see 
what direction the review takes.”316  Environmental groups were 
shocked by the recommendation to DOJ and charged that the Bush 
administration was inserting politics into the law enforcement process 
by sending a thinly veiled message to the defendants in the litigation 
not to settle with the government.317  Environmental groups and state 
attorneys general made it clear that they would continue to pursue 
their citizen enforcement actions if the government backed out of the 
litigation.318 
Both EPA and DOJ put into place an immediate freeze on new 
NSR enforcement actions pending the completion of the 90-day 
review by EPA of its NSR policies and DOJ’s review of the pending 
litigation.319  EPA even sent a letter to recipients of its demands for 
information instructing them to put the demands on hold.320  
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham took the position that DOJ 
should abruptly drop at least some of the lawsuits, but Whitman 
strongly supported moving ahead with the suits that had already been 
filed so as not to send a message to all EPA regulatees that they could 
violate the environmental laws with impunity.321  Not surprisingly, the 
companies participating in the settlement negotiations were not 
nearly as eager to agree to expensive upgrades while EPA and DOJ 
were seriously re-evaluating the bona fides of the original lawsuits.322  
With the announcement of the reviews, sales of pollution control 
devices declined sharply because companies were not inclined to 
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spend a lot of money on technologies that might not be required by 
the new administration.323 
As the Justice Department’s internal investigation of the NSR 
cases proceeded apace in the Office of Legal Counsel, attorneys in the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division quietly pressed ahead 
with the discovery, expert preparation, and motions practice in the 
existing cases.324  The Justice Department’s 90-day report, published 
on January 16, 2002, concluded that EPA’s interpretation of its NSR 
regulations and its position in the ongoing litigation were 
“reasonable.”325  In particular, EPA’s position that it had not departed 
from its previous interpretations of the regulations was reasonable, 
the report concluded.326  Since the ongoing enforcement actions were 
“supported by a reasonable basis in law and fact, any decision to 
withdraw, terminate, or otherwise circumscribe them would constitute 
policy determinations . . . that properly rest[ed] with EPA.”327  
Industry representatives disagreed with the DOJ conclusion, but they 
noted that the administration could adopt a different policy in the 
future, and, in their view, it should do just that.328 
Attorney General John Ashcroft told the press that DOJ would 
continue to pursue the litigation that had already been filed until and 
unless EPA changed either its enforcement policy or the 
regulations.329  For the next several months, DOJ pursued the lawsuits 
quite vigorously.  In January, it entered into a proposed settlement 
agreement with PSEG Fossil in which the New Jersey utility company 
agreed to spend $337 million over a ten-year period on scrubbers and 
selective catalytic reduction technologies capable of reducing SO2 
emissions by ninety percent and NOx emissions by eighty percent at 
its plants in Jersey City and Hamilton Township.330  The company also 
agreed to pay $1.4 million in civil penalties and spend $6 million on 
supplemental environmental projects.331 
                                                        
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Cook, Lawsuits Going Ahead, supra note 318. 
 325.  Steve Cook, DOJ Announces New Source Review Cases May Proceed, Asserting Law Sup-
ports Them, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 117 (Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Cook, Cases May Proceed]; 
Christopher Marquis, E.P.A. Power Plant Cases to Proceed, Ashcroft Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2002, at A12. 
 326.  Cook, Cases May Proceed, supra note 325, at 117; Justice Backs EPA on New Sources . . . 
Sort of, ELEC. DAILY, Jan. 22, 2002. 
 327.  Cook, Cases May Proceed, supra note 325. 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Marquis, supra note 325. 
 330.  Steve Cook, New Jersey Electric Utility Will Spend $337 Million for Controls at Power 
Plants, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 222 (Feb. 1, 2002). 
 331.  Id. 
  
1250 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1204 
The NSR enforcement initiative suffered a major blow in 
February 2002 when Eric Schaeffer, the Director of the Office of 
Regulatory Enforcement, resigned.332  In a letter that was widely 
reported in the press, Schaeffer complained that the NSR reforms 
that were emerging from the negotiations between EPA, the White 
House and the Department of Energy would completely undermine 
his office’s attempts to enforce the existing regulations.333  Indeed, the 
prolonged debate was itself affecting the settlement negotiations.334  
He complained that the agency was about to “snatch defeat from the 
jaws of victory” in its ongoing enforcement efforts as reports of the 
agency’s largely unsuccessful battles with “a White House that seems 
determined to weaken the rules we are trying to enforce” caused 
defendants in existing enforcement actions to walk away from 
settlement negotiations.335 
The government’s enforcement efforts suffered another blow 
when Administrator Whitman testified on March 7, 2002 before the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that NSR review was “a 
program that needs to be fixed.”336  She also complained that the 
agency spent “an awful lot of money” on legal fees “that could go to 
enhancing the environment.”337  But she promised that the Bush 
administration was “not going to undermine the Clean Air Act,” and it 
was not going to “stop enforcing the environmental laws.”338  
Nevertheless, she conceded that if she were a plaintiff’s attorney, she 
would “not settle anything until I knew what happened” in the lawsuit 
against TVA,339 which at that time was pending in the Sixth Circuit.  
That concession, which was widely reported in the press,340 generated 
much criticism for sending a message to defendants in the NSR 
litigation that they should abandon ongoing settlement 
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negotiations.341  A prominent utility company lawyer allowed that it 
should not “shock anybody that a good lawyer would want to see how” 
the TVA lawsuit was resolved.342 
C.  Changes to the NSR Regulations 
EPA’s 90-day report, which finally came out in June 2002, 
concluded that “the NSR program ha[d] not significantly impeded 
investment in new power plants,”343 but it had “impeded or resulted in 
the cancellation of projects which would maintain and improve 
reliability, efficiency and safety of existing energy capacity.”344  This, in 
turn, had “result[ed] in lost capacity, as well as lost opportunities to 
improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution.”345  A large 
volume of anecdotal evidence suggested that “concern about the 
scope of the routine maintenance exclusion” was having an “adverse 
impact on projects that affect availability, reliability, efficiency, and 
safety.”346  This was exactly what the industry had been arguing ever 
since EPA launched the NSR enforcement initiative in 1999.  Overall, 
the report concluded that the NSR program had significant but 
difficult to quantify environmental and public health benefits,347 but 
those benefits could be achieved “much more efficiently and at much 
lower cost” if Congress enacted the administration’s proposed “Clear 
Skies” cap-and-trade legislation.348  Pending legislative reform, the 
agency would implement changes to the existing NSR program to 
“add to the clarity and certainty of the scope of the routine 
maintenance exclusion.”349 
Simultaneously with the release of the report, EPA Administrator 
Whitman announced two major rulemaking initiatives related to NSR.  
The first action would be to revive and finalize the NSR Simplification 
Rule.350  The second initiative, called the “Safe Harbor” Rule, would 
greatly expand the RMRR exemption by providing a safe harbor for 
any changes for which the capital expenditure did not exceed a 
                                                        
 341.  Id. (citing Sen. Joseph Lieberman and John Stanton, National Environmental 
Trust). 
 342.  Id. (quoting Scott Segal, attorney, Bracewell & Guiliani). 
 343.  EPA NSR REPORT, supra note 246, at 1. 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  Id. at 11. 
 347.  Id. at 1, 2. 
 348.  Id. at 2. 
 349.  Id. at 11. 
 350.  Steve Cook, Long-Awaited Administration Reforms Seek Relaxed Requirements for Power 
Plants, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1309 (June 14, 2002) [hereinafter Cook, Relaxed Requirements]. 
  
1252 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1204 
specified threshold, whether or not the change resulted in an 
increase in emissions.351  The agency was considering cost thresholds 
in the range of 1.5% through 15% of the asset value of the changed 
unit.352 
The Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance staff 
urged the OAR staff to draft the rules with enforcement in mind, and 
Office of Air and Radiation changed the NSR Simplification Rule 
slightly to meet their concerns.353  OECA’s more serious concerns, 
however, were with the Safe Harbor Rule.354  Noting that nearly all of 
the cases in the ongoing NSR litigation raised issues under the RMRR 
regulations, OECA attorneys were concerned that a regulation 
providing a bright-line threshold would undermine their argument 
that the RMRR exemption had to be applied on a case-by-case basis 
based on factors highlighted in WEPCO.355  It would also limit their 
selection of remedies, because a judge was unlikely to require a 
source to install expensive pollution controls to remedy violations of 
rules that were no longer in effect.356  OECA warned that a threshold 
any greater than 1% to 2% of the unit’s cost would mean that 95% to 
98% of modifications challenged in the ongoing litigation would 
come within the Safe Harbor Rule.357 
The final NSR Simplification Rule358 that the agency published 
on December 31, 2002 had five major components.  First, in 
determining “baseline” emissions, sources were allowed to use any 
consecutive two-year period from the previous ten years,359 rather than 
the two-year period immediately preceding the change.  Second, the 
rule prescribed an “actual-to-future-actual” test for all sources that was 
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virtually identical to the test that the WEPCO Rule had adopted for 
power plants.360  The agency did not eliminate the demand growth 
discount in calculating future actual emissions as it had proposed in 
1998.361  As a practical matter, the operator’s ability to pick and 
choose baseline years and to make optimistic projections of future 
demand growth greatly reduced the universe of changes that would 
be subject to NSR.362 
Third, the rule allowed sources to establish plantwide 
applicability limits (“PALs”) that allowed them to avoid NSR so long 
as any changes to equipment within a plant that increased actual 
emissions were accompanied by other changes that brought about 
offsetting decreases in actual emissions within the same plant.363  The 
PAL could be determined on the basis of any consecutive two-year 
period in the previous ten years.364  Since the PAL was renewable for 
another ten years if the source was emitting at eighty percent of its 
PAL or higher,365 the new rule effectively rewarded sources that did 
little to reduce emissions.  Fourth, the rule provided a shield from 
NSR for “Clean Units” that had already undergone NSR and were 
therefore subject to BACT or LAER.366  The rule went a step further, 
however, to allow units that had not undergone NSR to qualify as a 
clean unit if they had installed emissions control technology 
comparable to BACT or LAER technology within the previous ten 
years.367  Fifth, the rule created a new list of environmentally 
beneficial technologies that qualified as pollution control projects 
and were therefore exempt from NSR.368 
The rule allowed the source to conclude that NSR was 
inapplicable to a project if there was not a “reasonable possibility” that 
the change would trigger NSR, but the rule did not specify how the 
source would go about making that determination.369  Nor did the 
rule require companies to keep records supporting that 
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determination.370  Many state and local air pollution control agencies 
were concerned that this “self-policing” aspect of the rule would make 
enforcement very difficult.371  Nine northeastern states and several 
environmental groups challenged the rule in the D.C. Circuit.372  In 
June 2005, the court upheld all but a few relatively minor aspects of 
the rule.373 
On the last day of 2002, EPA published its safe-harbor proposal.374  
The agency proposed two approaches to defining a bright-line test for 
inclusion of a project within the RMRR exemption.  Under the first 
approach, a project would fall within the RMRR exemption if its total 
costs did not exceed an annual maintenance, repair and replacement 
allowance (expressed as a prescribed percentage of the unit’s 
replacement cost), even if it resulted in an increase in emissions.375  If 
the project exceeded the allowance, it could still come within the 
RMRR exemption under the five-factor WEPCO test.376  Under the 
second approach, a project designed to replace existing equipment 
with equipment that served the same function and did not alter the 
unit’s basic design would come within the RMRR exemption if its cost 
did not exceed a specified cost threshold (expressed as a percentage 
of the fixed capital cost of rebuilding a comparable new unit), even if 
it resulted in an increase in emissions.377 
The proposal encountered a storm cloud of opposition from 
environmental groups, state air control agencies, and attorneys 
general from downwind states.378  Thousands of modifications that 
were clearly covered by the statute would be exempted, they argued, 
and ancient facilities would escape NSR in perpetuity.379  Many of the 
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positions that the agency was taking in the proposal directly 
repudiated the positions that the agency was taking in the NSR 
litigation.380  They were confident that “wily and sophisticated” 
industry lawyers would “read the writing on the wall” and either delay 
or terminate the ongoing settlement negotiations in the NSR 
litigation.381  It was “a shame to see the administration directly 
undercutting career prosecutors at the Department of Justice, who 
have a very strong case proving a pattern of violation industry-wide.”382 
The electric utility industry supported the proposed revisions as a 
“critical first step” toward NSR reform.383  They agreed with the agency 
that the rules would “create certainty and remove complexity and 
delay.”384  Indeed, they claimed, the rule would benefit the 
environment by allowing sources to proceed ahead with pollution 
control and efficiency-enhancing projects more expeditiously.385  They 
criticized the agency for not making the rule immediately effective so 
as to provide defendants in the NSR enforcement actions with a 
strong argument that their lawsuits should be dismissed.386 
The final rule that EPA published on October 27, 2003 allowed 
companies to replace components of a process unit with 
identical components or their functional equivalents . . . , 
provided the cost of replacing the component [fell] below 
20 percent of the replacement value of the process unit . . . , 
the replacement d[id] not change the unit’s basic design 
parameters, and the unit continue[d] to meet enforceable 
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emission and operational limitations [in the source’s 
permit].387 
The rule defined “functionally equivalent” to preclude changes in the 
“basic design parameters” of the affected unit, but not to preclude 
changes that enhanced the efficiency of the unit.388  The replacement 
could result in an increase in emissions, so long as the increase did 
not cause the unit to exceed any legally enforceable emissions 
limitation or operational limitation otherwise applicable to the unit.389 
D.  Inconsistent Enforcement of the Existing Rules 
At the same time that it was supporting EPA’s efforts to 
promulgate the NSR Simplification and Safe Harbor rules, the 
industry and its allies were putting pressure on the Bush 
administration to dismiss the pending lawsuits.390  At the staff level, 
however, EPA was continuing to assemble new cases for 
prosecution.391  Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance John Peter Suarez initially told the press that 
the agency was vigorously prosecuting existing cases and building new 
cases against violators of the old rules.392  The enforcement effort was, 
however, hampered by staff reductions required by Bush 
administration budget cuts.393  Citing resource limitations, DOJ 
agreed to stay cases against Georgia Power and Alabama Power for 
several years.394 
Then, in November 2003, Suarez announced that he had 
instructed the EPA staff to refrain from bringing new enforcement 
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actions against companies for modifications that violated existing 
regulations but did not violate the rules as amended by the NSR 
Simplification and Safe Harbor rules.395  Suarez had reluctantly 
concluded that the two regulations represented more than a mere 
policy change; they represented “a fundamental change in NSR 
enforcement and interpretation that harmed OECA’s enforcement of 
NSR violations.”396  He instructed the staff, however, to press ahead 
with the cases that the Justice Department had already filed.397 
Following that announcement, OECA abandoned ongoing 
investigations into seventy suspected violators of the old NSR rules, 
and it ceased work on forty-seven cases for which it had already issued 
notices of violation to the sources.398  An EPA enforcement official 
concluded that under the twenty-percent safe harbor, “almost 
everything we worked to achieve is wiped out.”399  The Justice 
Department’s environmental enforcement division, now headed by a 
former lobbyist for the coal industry,400 likewise abandoned claims 
under the pre-amendment versions of the RMRR regulations.401  The 
Justice Department filed only three lawsuits against energy companies 
during the first three years of the George W. Bush administration, 
down ninety percent from the previous three years.402  The agency’s 
clear lack of concern for the pending cases precipitated an exodus of 
experienced enforcement attorneys.403  Two of the high-level career 
employees who departed said that they had warned Administrator 
Whitman that the rule changes would undermine the pending cases, 
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but they were overruled.404  According to one career employee, “[t]he 
rug was pulled out from under us.”405 
The agency persisted in its new enforcement policy even after the 
D.C. Circuit in late December stayed the Safe Harbor Rule.406  This 
was, of course, precisely the outcome that the coal-burning utilities 
had desired when they were vigorously lobbying the agency to amend 
the NSR rules.  Outraged environmental groups charged the agency 
with shirking a major responsibility by not prosecuting companies 
that violated the rules that were in effect at the time.407  They also 
noted that since the new rules would not become effective for up to 
three years in most states, the agency was effectively giving scofflaws a 
get-out-of-jail-free pass for ongoing violations of the rules that 
remained in effect until the Safe Harbor Rule was finalized.408  The 
state attorneys general who were also parties to the lawsuit vowed to 
pursue the existing cases to completion, with or without EPA, and 
they asked DOJ to make the government’s files available to them.409 
The criticism had an impact on newly arrived EPA Administrator 
Michael Leavitt.  Less than three months after Suarez’s 
announcement, Leavitt announced that EPA would continue to 
initiate enforcement actions against owners of plants that violated the 
old rules.410  Leavitt told the enforcement staff that “enforcement is an 
essential part of our mission, and we will enforce the law.”411  Soon 
thereafter, in late January 2004, the Justice Department filed the first 
new NSR enforcement case against a power plant since the onset of 
the Bush administration.412  To defuse criticism during the election 
season, the agency “abruptly took a tougher approach to the utility 
industry” and warned of new lawsuits if plants did not clean up in 
anticipation of the new policies.413  In one major settlement, an Ohio 
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utility company agreed to pay $1.1 billion in fines and pollution 
controls for four of its power plants.414 
E.  The Hourly Emissions Rule (August 31, 2005) 
After the 2004 elections returned George W. Bush to the White 
House, EPA unveiled more deregulatory initiatives designed to 
reduce the impact of the NSR program on power plants.  First on the 
list was a new “Hourly Emissions” rule.  As we have seen, EPA’s new 
source performance standards were stated in units of kilograms per 
hour, whereas the NSR regulations were stated in tons per year 
because the thresholds in the PSD and nonattainment provisions of 
the 1977 Amendments for “majorness” were stated in tons per year.415  
In the government’s lawsuit against Duke Energy, the Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the company that a source did not have to undergo NSR 
for projects that increased annual emissions if they did not increase 
hourly emissions.416  But the state attorneys general and 
environmental groups who brought the Duke Energy challenge 
appealed to the Supreme Court,417 and the D.C. Circuit had reached 
the opposite result in an earlier case.418  The agency hoped to render 
the case moot by amending the NSR regulations to shift the focus to 
hourly emissions.419  As with the other rules easing the NSR 
restrictions, EPA explained that the Clean Air Interstate Rule 
(“CAIR”) would more than offset any emissions increases attributable 
to moving to the hourly emissions approach.420 
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Although it would take another two years for EPA to publish a 
notice of proposed rulemaking,421 the radical shift in policy affected 
the ongoing litigation.  In the Duke Energy case, the Solicitor General 
filed a brief with the Supreme Court opposing review of the Fourth 
Circuit decision.422  The brief noted that EPA was considering 
revisions to the NSR regulations that would render the Fourth Circuit 
opinion “of limited practical import.”423  More important, Deputy 
Administrator Marcus Peacock ordered OECA to stop working on 
potential new cases that involved violations of the annual emissions 
NSR rule along with cases that involved projects that would have come 
within the twenty-percent safe harbor.424  The memo noted that other 
“rulemakings, particularly CAIR, will reduce power plant emissions 
deeper, faster, and more efficiently than would be achieved by 
continuing costly and uncertain litigation in case-by-case enforcement 
actions of existing . . . regulations.”425  This, of course, assumed that 
the rules would go into effect expeditiously.  After the memo issued, 
the flow of NSR enforcement actions slowed to a trickle.  During 
2007, DOJ filed only two NSR cases against the utility companies.426  
Another immediate effect of the Peacock memo was to inspire 
companies that had taken the same position as Duke Power in the 
NSR litigation to file motions to dismiss the lawsuits.427 
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In a quixotic effort to demonstrate that it had not abandoned 
NSR enforcement altogether, OECA in April 2006 sent letters to three 
companies asking for more information about recent maintenance 
and repair projects.428  Eric Schaeffer, now of the Environmental 
Integrity Project, gave the OECA staff credit because, like the 
Energizer bunny, they kept on trying.429  Scott Segal of the Electric 
Reliability Coordinating Council hoped that the letters did not 
represent a change in policy, noting that the CAIR “probably 
pushe[d] most facilities beyond where NSR settlements would be 
expected in any event.”430  That conclusion was supported by a July 
2006 report by the National Academy of Sciences’ National Research 
Council, which concluded that by the time that CAIR was fully 
implement in twelve years, the emissions reductions from old power 
plants required by that rule would largely offset the additional 
emissions allowed by the changes to the NSR program.431  This 
assessment, too, assumed that CAIR would in fact go into effect and 
be fully enforced. 
During oral argument before the Supreme Court in November 
2006, the government switched gears and sided with the 
environmental groups and downwind state attorneys general.432  
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked the DOJ lawyer how its position 
was consistent with the fact that EPA would now allow Duke to avoid 
NSR under an hourly emissions test.433  He replied that the hourly 
emissions proposal was just that—a proposal.434  Justice Antonin Scalia 
interjected that companies could get “whipsawed” by EPA’s 
inconsistent positions.435 
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court unanimously held that EPA 
could properly employ an annual emissions test for determining 
whether a project qualified for NSR and an hourly test for 
determining whether the new source performance standards applied 
to a change to an existing unit.436  The Fourth Circuit’s construction 
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of the NSR regulations to conform to the NSPS regulations was simply 
not permissible.437  Environmental groups were pleased with their 
victory but warned that EPA still had an agenda to “abolish the NSR 
program altogether for the benefit of the utility sector.”438  EPA called 
the decision “an important victory for EPA,”439 but it made it clear that 
it would proceed with its proposal to adopt an hourly standard for 
NSR.440 
Later that month, EPA published the long-awaited notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the Hourly Rate Rule.441  The proposed rule 
would have allowed sources to avoid NSR if a modification did not 
increase the hourly rate of emissions, even if it increased annual 
emissions because it allowed the plant to operate for more hours 
during the year.442  If the hourly emissions increased, the agency 
would then examine whether annual emissions increased.443  Only if 
both hourly and annual emissions increased would the source have to 
undergo NSR.444  The agency said that the Supreme Court’s Duke 
Energy opinion did not affect the rulemaking in any way.445  EPA 
predicted that CAIR would more than make up for any emissions 
increases due to the move to hourly emissions.446 
F.  The Demise of the Safe Harbor Rule 
Two major assumptions underlying the Peacock memo were that 
the agency would in fact promulgate the Hourly Rate Rule and that 
the Safe Harbor Rule would survive judicial review.  The second 
premise disappeared when, on March 17, 2006, the D.C. Circuit 
vacated the rule because it so clearly departed from the plain 
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meaning of the statutory definition of “modification.”447  The court 
found that the words “any physical change” in that definition were 
unambiguous and clearly included equipment replacements.448  The 
court agreed with the environmental groups that Congress’s use of 
the modifier “any” demonstrated that the term “physical change” 
included “any activity at a source that could be considered a physical 
change that increases emissions.”449  In a rather gratuitous slam on the 
agency, the court noted that “[o]nly in a Humpty Dumpty world 
would Congress be required to use superfluous words while an agency 
could ignore an expansive word that Congress did use.”450  The agency 
was empowered to exclude activities that resulted in de minimis 
amounts of emissions, but the emissions permitted by the twenty-
percent safe harbor were hardly trivial.451 
The decision did not affect many ongoing projects, because the 
industry had complied with the old rules after the court stayed the 
Safe Harbor Rule.452  The industry complained, however, that 
continuing uncertainty over EPA’s case-by-case application of the 
WEPCO factors would have a “chilling effect” on investments in 
maintenance and repair.453  The court’s decision therefore lent 
urgency to the efforts in Congress to enact NSR amendments to the 
Clean Air Act.454  Because it was an election year and the Republican 
majorities in both houses were at considerable risk, it was not a good 
time to push through legislation that environmental activists would 
characterize as a free pass for polluters.455 
Environmental groups and downwind state attorneys general 
were delighted with the holding.  New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer predicted that it would “encourage industry to build new and 
cleaner facilities, instead of prolonging the life of old, dirty plants.”456  
Industry lawyers, however, urged the agency to exercise its 
enforcement discretion to continue to allow projects that fell within 
the twenty-percent safe harbor.457  EPA declined that invitation and, in 
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late May 2008, it did not renew the Peacock memo.458  Soon 
thereafter, the director of EPA’s air enforcement division announced 
that it was currently investigating ten to twenty power companies for 
possible violations of the NSR regulations.459 
G.  Effect of the Rulemaking Activities on the Ongoing Litigation 
Whether EPA’s NSR rulemaking initiatives had an adverse effect 
on the ongoing NSR litigation was a matter of some debate at the 
time.  The head of the DOJ environmental enforcement division 
denied that the regulations had any impact on the ongoing 
settlement negotiations, but he acknowledged that whether they 
would affect the outcomes of the cases going to trial would depend on 
the judges.460  A senior DOJ attorney who was familiar with the 
litigation predicted that the ten utility companies that were subject to 
the outstanding lawsuits at the outset of the Bush administration were 
unlikely to settle, and, if they did, the settlements would most likely be 
on terms dictated by the rules that were in effect at the time.461 
The upper level politically appointed officials at EPA who were 
responsible for promulgating the rules steadfastly denied that they 
would have any impact on the litigation.462  Then-Assistant 
Administrator for Air and Radiation Jeffrey Holmstead testified that 
the impact of the NSR Simplification and Safe Harbor rules on the 
ongoing litigation was “one of the primary issues that was discussed” 
at meetings attended by EPA and DOJ attorneys, and they did “not 
believe these changes w[ould] have a negative impact on the 
enforcement cases.”463 
This account, however, was inconsistent with the position of 
OECA during the internal agency deliberations.464  A June 2002 
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memorandum written by Sylvia K. Lowrance, a deputy assistant 
administrator in OECA, warned that the changes effectuated by the 
NSR Simplification and Safe Harbor rules would “undermine” the 
ongoing enforcement litigation.465  EPA officials who were directly 
involved in the NSR enforcement initiative from its inception warned 
that the rule changes were having a devastating impact on the 
settlement negotiations.466  One dejected EPA enforcement officer 
who had been with the agency since its inception decided to retire out 
of frustration at seeing “some or our significant advances taken 
away.”467  A report by the agency’s Inspector General concluded that 
the proposed NSR changes had “seriously hampered” the agency’s 
“settlement activities, existing enforcement cases, and the 
development of future cases.”468 
As discussed above, two major companies, Cinergy and Dominion 
walked away from settlement negotiations in which they had already 
entered into agreements in principle with the government to spend a 
total of about $1.9 billion on additional pollution controls.469  
According to Eric Schaeffer, who was present at the negotiations, 
“[t]hey put their tons of pollution on the table, they shook hands with 
us,” and then EPA proposed to change the underlying regulations.470  
Two years later, in April 2003, Dominion agreed to a settlement with 
EPA and five states that was virtually identical to the earlier agreement 
in principle.471  By contrast, Cinergy never returned to the settlement 
table, preferring instead to litigate every conceivable issue in a long 
and drawn out war of attrition that lasted for more than a decade.472 
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The companies made effective use of the NSR Simplification and 
Safe Harbor rules in the litigation.473  According to Eric Schaeffer, 
attorneys for TVA “walked right into court” in the pending Eleventh 
Circuit litigation and “waved a copy of the proposed changes, and said 
very clearly that the court should consider putting off or postponing 
hearing the case or making a decision because the government was 
still making its mind up as to what the law was.”474  In another case, 
the government was forced to concede that the Clean Air Act did not 
require a narrow interpretation of the RMRR exemption when 
confronted with the agency’s own contemplated changes in the Safe 
Harbor proposal.475  In still another case, the defendant argued that 
“EPA now admits what is obvious: Industry . . . has not been provided 
ascertainable certainty regarding what is ‘routine.’”476  One district 
court concluded that “[g]iven EPA’s zigs and zags . . . the court 
cannot say that EPA’s interpretation of its rules is due to be 
afforded . . . deference.”477  The changes also affected litigation filed 
by environmental groups and state attorneys general in which EPA 
did not participate.478  Cinergy even argued that the government’s 
lawyers should be sanctioned for bringing the case in the first place.479 
H.  NSR Enforcement During the Bush Administration 
By the end of the George W. Bush administration, it was clear 
that its on-again-off-again approach to NSR enforcement had resulted 
in: a number of important settlements of the cases that DOJ had 
initiated at the end of the Clinton administration; a few new cases 
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(mostly during the first term and near the end of the second term), 
most of which were still in litigation at the end of the administration; 
and a few major trials in the holdover cases from the Clinton 
administration.  Unwilling to trust the administration to bring and 
vigorously prosecute NSR enforcement actions, several environmental 
groups filed citizen enforcement actions against several companies for 
NSR violations. 
1.  Settlements 
EPA’s perennial problem of lack of enforcement resources made 
settlements far more attractive than full-scale litigation, and the cuts 
to the agency’s enforcement budget during the George W. Bush years 
made things even worse.480  The point of the exercise was not so much 
to extract large fines from the companies as it was to force them 
either to install the modern technologies that they should have 
employed years ago or to retire the old plants.481  The agency’s 
settlement negotiations were, as discussed above, affected by the 
changes to the NSR program that the agency was attempting to 
implement through rulemaking in response to Vice President 
Cheney’s Energy Task Force.482 
In late 2001 and early 2002, EPA entered into a series of 
settlements with owners of major oil refineries, a major paper 
company, a major coal company, a major aluminum company, and 
the owner of fifty-two ethanol plants.483  The public utility companies 
were not as anxious to settle as companies in the other industries, but 
fifteen electric utility companies over the course of the George W. 
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Bush administration entered into major settlements in which they 
agreed to pay a total of $57,450,000 in fines, spend $224,450,000 on 
supplemental projects, and invest $11,127,000,000 in pollution 
control equipment at 174 units with a predicted reduction in SO2 
emissions of 1,288,745 tons per year and in NOx emissions of 434,844 
tons per year.484  The largest settlement was an October 9, 2007 
agreement with American Electric Power in which the company 
agreed to pay a fine of $15 million, support supplementary 
environmental projects worth $60 million, and spend $4.6 billion to 
clean up twenty-five power plants.485  The settlement, which was the 
largest in EPA’s history, came at the end of a long trial but before the 
judge had rendered a decision.486  The predicted SO2 emissions 
reductions from that single settlement exceeded the total SO2 emitted 
by all sources in forty-five states.487 
All of the settlements contained similar features, including a 
denial of liability by the defendants, retirement or installation of 
control technologies on existing units, a prohibition on selling or 
trading any excess emissions allowances from controls required by the 
consent decrees (to ensure that the emissions reductions actually 
occurred), relatively low fines, a requirement to invest in 
supplemental environmental projects, and protection from future 
NSR enforcement actions for a specified number of years.488  
Although the Bush administration took credit for these impressive 
settlements, many of their benefits would have resulted if the 
government had walked away from the lawsuits because state attorneys 
general and environmental groups would have pursued them. 
2.  Cases That Went to Trial 
The Justice Department and EPA also brought several of the 
pending cases to trial.489  Those trials frequently revealed internal 
documents demonstrating that the companies were consciously 
disregarding EPA guidance documents and letters that made it clear 
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that the projects at issue would trigger NSR.490  The real motivation 
appeared to be to avoid the cost of complying with the law.491  The 
Justice Department won several of these cases and in the process set 
some important precedents.492  In some cases, however, DOJ lawyers 
were unable to convince courts and juries that the companies had 
engaged in unlawful life extension activities.493  And in one case, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict for EPA on appeal.494 
3.  Filing New Cases 
EPA and DOJ brought only three new cases against power plants 
during the George W. Bush administration, and one was simply to 
gain judicial approval for an agreed-upon settlement.  In January 
2002, DOJ entered into a settlement with PSEG Power, a New Jersey 
power company, for PSEG Power’s stated purpose of avoiding 
expensive litigation.495  Two years later, DOJ filed the first full-fledged 
enforcement action against East Kentucky Power Cooperative 
claiming that the company had, on several occasions, modified coal-
burning units at two plants.496  The lawsuit was filed soon after 
Administrator Leavitt announced that the agency would take a 
tougher approach to enforcement.497  More than three years after 
that, DOJ filed an enforcement action against Kentucky Utilities Co. 
for violations occurring at its E.W. Brown power plant in Mercer 
County, Kentucky.  The violations were so egregious that they would 
have violated both the Safe Harbor and Hourly Rate rules.498  Frank 
O’Donnell, the head of Clean Air Watch, observed near the end of 
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the Clinton administration that “the U.S. electric industry was 
frantically on the run because federal enforcers were going after them 
at every turn,” but “[t]hen the Bush administration called off the 
dogs.”499 
4.  State and Environmental Group Lawsuits 
State attorneys general and environmental groups were far more 
active than the Bush administration in filing lawsuits against power 
plant operators for violating the NSR regulations, especially during 
the times that EPA enforcers were not allowed to pursue cases that 
did not involve violations of its Safe Harbor and Hourly Rate rules.  
The citizen enforcement actions included the following: 
NRG Energy (January 2002)—The State of New York sued NRG 
Energy, Inc. for failing to undergo NSR with respect to more than fifty 
projects undertaken over a seventeen-year period at two coal-burning 
power plants near Buffalo.500 
Dayton Power & Light (July 2004)—The Sierra Club initiated the 
process of suing Dayton Power & Light Co. following up on a notice 
of violation that EPA issued in 2000 to the plant for failing to undergo 
NSR after having engaged in major modifications at its Stuart Station 
near Cincinnati.501 
Southwestern Electric Power (March 2005)—Several environmental 
groups sued American Electric Power and its Southwestern Electric 
Power Co. subsidiary alleging that the company had violated the NSR 
regulations at its Welsh power plant near Pittsburg, Texas.502 
Allegheny Energy (June 2005)—Four northeastern states initiated 
the process of suing Allegheny Energy, Inc. for projects that 
significantly increased emissions at five West Virginia coal plants.  
New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer found it “disturbing that the 
federal government is no longer enforcing the Clean Air Act.”503 
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Mirant (July 2005)—Four environmental groups filed notices of 
intent to sue Mirant Corp. for NSR violations at its Dickerson power 
plant in Montgomery County, Maryland.504 
Rochester Gas & Electric (October 2006)—The State of New York 
sent a notice of intent to sue Rochester Gas & Electric for long-
standing violations of the NSR rules.505 
5.  The Barack Obama Administration 
The 2008 elections sent to the White House a dynamic young 
president who had run on a platform of hope and change.506  It also 
increased the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress.507  
Environmental groups and downwind state attorneys general had 
every reason to believe that the new administration would aggressively 
pursue the existing NSR enforcement cases, file many more new cases 
against companies that continued to undertake life extension projects 
without undergoing NSR, and withdraw or rescind the controversial 
proposals of the Bush years.  When President Obama appointed Lisa 
Jackson, the aggressive Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of 
Environmental Protection, to be his EPA administrator, they were 
delighted.508  Their hopes, however, were only partially fulfilled. 
The Obama administration moved rapidly to reinvigorate the 
NSR enforcement initiative that had gone moribund during the Bush 
administration.  On February 4, 2009, EPA and DOJ issued a joint 
release announcing a new “national initiative, targeting electric 
utilities whose coal-fired power plants violate the law.”509  In deciding 
whether projects came within the RMMR exclusion, the agency 
employed the WEPCO multi-factor test that it had employed prior to 
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the promulgation and reversal of the Safe Harbor Rule.510  An 
attorney for utility companies said that it looked like government 
prosecutors were “starting out where they left off in 2000.”511 
EPA followed up on the announcement with a raft of new 
lawsuits.512  The first lawsuit was filed on the day of the announcement 
against Westar Energy, Inc. alleging that it had engaged in major 
modifications without undergoing NSR at its Jeffrey Energy Center in 
St. Marys, Kansas.513  Later that month, DOJ/EPA sued NRG Energy 
for several major modifications it had undertaken at its Big Cajun 2 
power plant in Louisiana without undergoing NSR.514  In March, 
DOJ/EPA sued American Municipal Power Corp. for violations at its 
Gorsuch plant near Marietta, Ohio.515  Five months later, DOJ/EPA 
sued Midwest Generation alleging that it made numerous 
modifications to six coal-burning power plants in Illinois.516 
At this point the initiative slowed, but did not come to a 
complete stop.  In August 2010, DOJ/EPA sued DTE Energy for NSR 
violations at its Monroe power plant in Monroe, Michigan.517  In that 
case, however, the court held that the company’s modifications were 
not unlawful because they complied with the 2002 NSR Simplification 
Rule.518  In January 2011, DOJ/EPA filed a lawsuit against Ameren 
Missouri for failing to comply with the NSR regulations at its Rush 
Island coal-fired power plant.519  In some of these later filed cases, the 
courts dismissed some or all of the claims for civil penalties because 
the violations had occurred more than five years prior to the filing of 
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the lawsuits and were therefore barred by the general five-year statute 
of limitations.520 
The new enforcement initiative included a major effort to settle 
pending cases.  According to the Government Accountability Office, 
between January 2009 and December 2011, DOJ/EPA settled seven 
cases against public utility companies and TVA in which the 
companies agreed to pay $21.5 million in fines, spend $395 million 
on supplemental environmental projects, spend $5.6 billion on 
pollution control equipment at eighty-six units with a predicted 
reduction in SO2 emissions of 445,684 tons per year and in NOx 
emissions of 160,582 tons per year.521  By far the largest of these 
settlements was with one of the original nine defendants, TVA, which 
agreed to pay $10 million in civil penalties, invest $350 million in 
supplemental environmental projects, and spend up to $5 billion on 
new controls at fifty-nine units that would reduce SO2 emissions by 
225,757 tons per year and NOx emissions by almost 116,000 tons per 
year.522  In July 2012, after GAO had tabulated the figures summarized 
above, DOJ/EPA entered into a settlement with Dairyland Power 
Cooperative, a small Wisconsin utility company, in which it agreed to 
pay a fine of $950,000, pay for supplemental environmental projects 
worth $5 million, and spend $150 million on pollution controls 
predicted to reduce total emissions by more than 29,000 tons per 
year.523 
As part of the National Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, EPA 
issued another round of information requests and began issuing 
notices of violation to electric utility companies, some of which 
resulted in settlements in which sources agreed to install state-of-the-
art pollution controls or to retire old units.524  When one company 
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refused to comply with EPA’s request for information on its future 
construction plans, EPA filed a lawsuit seeking a court order for the 
information.525  Environmental groups were pleased to see that EPA 
was “trying to be more diligent about enforcing plants across the 
country.”526 
Hoping to stimulate the government into greater action, 
environmental groups and downwind states sent sixty-day notices of 
intent to sue to several more power plants alleging that they had 
violated the NSR regulations.527  In some of those cases, the strategy 
worked as EPA intervened and, as the statute provides,528 took over 
control of the litigation.  For example, the DOJ/EPA lawsuit against 
Midwest Generation was filed less than a month after environmental 
groups filed a sixty-day notice of intent to sue the plant for the same 
violations.529  Noting that EPA and the company had been negotiating 
for years, the head of one of the local groups observed that “[t]hey 
were either going to give up on negotiations and file suit, or they were 
going to continue to negotiate and let a ragtag group of environment 
and health organizations actually enforce the law.”530 
VI.  DETERRENCE VERSUS ASSISTANCE AS VEHICLES FOR ADVANCING 
STATUTORY GOALS 
The federal government’s multi-year NSR enforcement initiative 
generated a great deal of controversy over whether a deterrence-
based approach was the most effective way to incentivize owners of 
grandfathered power plants to clean up or retire their most polluting 
units.  The debate over EPA’s NSR initiative is part of a larger debate 
over the efficacy of deterrence versus assistance as a tool for 
implementing environmental policy.  Drawing on the DOJ/EPA case 
study, this Part examines this broader question.  The lessons drawn 
from this analysis should be applicable in other contexts in which an 
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agency has a choice between deterrence and assistance in crafting 
regulatory policy.  This Part should also shed light on the less 
analyzed issue of the weight that agencies should give to ongoing 
enforcement efforts when they are contemplating reducing the 
stringency of the rules that are at the heart of the ongoing litigation. 
Evaluating the impacts of the DOJ/EPA enforcement initiative 
(or any enforcement effort, for that matter) is not a straightforward 
exercise.  Many different programs that EPA administers under the 
Clean Air Act affect power plant emissions, and it can be difficult to 
disaggregate the effects of one program from those of other 
programs.531  For example, it may be difficult to distinguish the impact 
of CAIR, which the D.C. Circuit set aside but left in place on an 
interim basis,532 from the impact of the DOJ/EPA NSR initiative. As we 
have seen, Bush administration officials belittled the NSR 
enforcement initiative because it did not compare favorably with 
CAIR or the Clear Skies legislation in terms of pollution reduction.533  
As it turned out, however, the comparison was illusory because 
neither of those alternatives became law.534 
To some extent, the debate over the DOJ/EPA enforcement 
initiative has been a debate over EPA’s aggressive interpretation of 
the word “modification” in the Clean Air Act, its narrow 
interpretation of the RMRR exemption in its NSR regulations, and 
the overall desirability of any NSR program.  Although the purpose of 
this Article is not to defend the concept of NSR and EPA’s 
interpretations of its statute and regulations, to the extent that 
substantive criticisms and defenses of the NSR program bleed into 
arguments about the desirability of the EPA/DOJ enforcement 
initiative as a vehicle for implementing that program, the Article will 
address them as well. 
The most carefully designed regulatory program imaginable will 
have no impact on environmental quality if the sources to which the 
program applies may ignore its requirements with impunity.  EPA has 
frequently stressed that “an effective federal enforcement and 
compliance assurance program is an indispensable element of the 
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national environmental protection system.”535  The theory of 
deterrence-based enforcement is based on the common sense 
premise that corporations are rational economic actors seeking to 
maximize profits and will therefore behave lawfully when the costs of 
noncompliance outweigh the benefits.536  The effectiveness of a 
sanction is a function of both the size of the penalty and the 
probability that the government will identify and prosecute violative 
conduct.537 
A.  Specific Deterrence 
One uncontroversial advantage of strict deterrence-based 
enforcement is that “it convinces the violator not to violate again,” a 
phenomenon known as “specific deterrence.”538  Specific deterrence 
speaks loudly and directly to flouters.  Once a flouter has been caught 
and punished, the flouter should be less likely to flout again.  Flouters 
who have no respect for the regulatory requirements may respect the 
power of the Department of Justice to drag them into court and to 
force them to pay stiff penalties for unlawful conduct.539  The extent 
to which the specific deterrence advantage of deterrence-based 
enforcement is realized in any given regulatory setting depends on 
the probability and the consequences of getting caught.  A slap on the 
wrist may not discourage recidivism, especially if the likelihood of 
getting caught is low. 
B.  General Deterrence 
A second great advantage of strict enforcement is the message 
that it sends to other companies that they also risk punishment if they 
violate the law.540  No matter how sensible the rule and no matter how 
persuasive the relevant regulatory agency is in explaining the need for 
compliance, the power of the government to punish errant conduct 
gives the agency a credibility that allows it to focus the attention of the 
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regulated entities on their responsibilities to others.541  This “general 
deterrence” function of strict enforcement depends upon the 
perception of members of the regulated community that sanctions 
will be swiftly implemented in a consistent fashion.542 
Minimal compliers carefully weigh the cost of compliance against 
the magnitude of the relief that the government is likely to seek 
discounted by the probability that the violation will be detected and 
prosecuted.  Strict deterrence-based enforcement increases both the 
magnitude of the probable penalty and the likelihood that the 
violation will be prosecuted, thereby sending to minimal compliers 
the message that they should not press the envelope of compliance.  
Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that deterrence-based 
enforcement is effective in achieving compliance with regulatory 
requirements and that “lack of meaningful sanctions has a significant 
adverse effect on compliance rates.”543  The approach appeared to 
work in the case of the DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement initiative.  EPA’s 
Office of Inspector General concluded in 2004 that the initiative was 
an effective way to ensure that utility companies installed pollution 
control devices when they were making other modifications.544 
C.  Effective Implementation 
If the assumption that minimal compliers and flouters make up a 
substantial percentage of regulated industry is accurate, then strict 
deterrence-based enforcement may be the best way to ensure that the 
policies underlying the relevant statute are implemented.  The Clean 
Air Act’s NSR program, for example, was the result of a grand 
legislative compromise under which existing sources were not subject 
to federally mandated pollution reduction technologies until they 
undertook significant modifications.545  Without strict federal 
enforcement of standards broadly defining “modification” and 
narrowly defining the RMRR exemptions, flouters and minimal 
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compliers will avoid NSR, thereby undermining the protective policies 
underlying the grand compromise. 
D.  Affirming Moral Values 
There is also a moral dimension to deterrence-based 
enforcement that emphasizes the importance of punishing companies 
that have been getting away with unlawful conduct.546  Connecticut 
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal called the defendants in the 
NSR litigation “brazen, blatant environmental outlaws” who deserved 
to be punished, not freed of their responsibilities by the assistance-
based policies of the Bush administration.547  Strict deterrence-based 
enforcement has the potential to “shore up the moral authority of the 
regulatory rule and the enforcement agency.”548  Compromise, 
conciliation, and promises to do better in the future in lieu of 
punishment “may delegitimize the rule violated and actually encourage 
noncompliance by others who would otherwise comply voluntarily.”549  
The closed door negotiations that frequently characterize assistance-
based approaches to enforcement fail to convey the important 
message to the regulated community that violating regulations 
designed to protect citizens is not just inefficient, it is wrong.550 
E.  Level Playing Fields 
Strict deterrence-based enforcement levels the playing field for 
maximal compliers who err on the side of compliance with the 
environmental laws.551  To the extent that they get away with conduct 
that violates the law, flouters and minimal compliers obtain a 
competitive advantage over maximal compliers that can be reflected 
in the prices of their competing products.552  This competitive 
advantage is especially clear in the case of NSR where owners of older 
units cross over the line of illegality to avoid installing expensive 
pollution controls that maximal compliers and owners of new sources 
will have to install.  Although they compete in the same deregulated 
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market for electricity, flouters and minimal compliers can produce 
electricity at lower cost than maximal compliers because they do not 
invest in pollution reduction technology. 
F.  Uncovering Information 
The lawsuits that characterize deterrence-based enforcement 
allow plaintiffs to uncover information that would otherwise remain 
buried in industry files.  For example, discovery in the NSR litigation 
turned up several “smoking gun” documents revealing that the 
electric utility industry, despite its protestations to the contrary, had 
known that projects causing large increases in emissions should have 
triggered NSR.553  Other documents discovered in the litigation 
showed that the Electric Power Research Institute had advised its 
members to identify life extension projects as “upgraded maintenance 
programs” and to “downplay the life extension aspects of these 
projects (and extended retirement dates) by referring to them as 
plant restoration . . . projects.”554 
G.  Innovative Remedies 
One very attractive attribute of strict deterrence-based 
enforcement is the wide and flexible variety of remedies that are 
available through judicial orders and consent decrees.  In addition to 
substantial monetary penalties of up to $27,500 per day, a court in a 
Clean Air Act case can mandate the installation of the state-of-the-art 
technologies that the company should have installed at the time of 
the change.555  Judicial injunctions or consent decrees can also 
require sources to fund “supplemental projects,” like installing 
additional pollution controls on municipal trucks and municipal 
wastewater facilities or specific actions to protect watersheds and 
forests in national parks, which are important to the surrounding 
communities.556 
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H.  Political Influence 
Like the legislative process, the rulemaking process is vulnerable 
to political influence.  Lobbyists for affected interest groups press 
their cases in private meetings with agency staff, high-level agency 
political appointees, officials in the Office of Management and 
Budget, White House staffers, and members of important 
congressional committees.  In high-stakes rulemaking, companies may 
take their cases to the general public through staged media events, 
advertisements, websites, and appeals by industry-funded “Astroturf” 
public interest groups.557  These efforts can easily shape the 
substantive outcome of rulemaking initiatives, especially when the 
motivation behind the rulemaking exercise is to assist the regulated 
industry.  For example, Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal 
attributed EPA’s 2002 decision to finalize the 1996 NSR Simplification 
rulemaking and to initiate the Safe Harbor Rule to political pressure 
from the energy industry through the Cheney Energy Task Force.558 
While deterrence-based approaches are not immune to political 
influence, they are considerably less vulnerable to political overtures 
than assistance-based rulemaking.  Media reports of strict deterrence-
based enforcement actions against politically powerful companies 
contribute to a public sense that wrongdoers are being held 
accountable for their unlawful activities and thereby enhance public 
trust in the regulatory regime.559  By contrast, the spectacle of an 
agency restraining enforcers or rewriting the rules to shield 
companies from enforcement actions of past violations of the law can 
destroy public faith in government, especially when it appears that 
violations are widespread and flagrant.560  For this reason, internal 
White House rules “typically prohibit White House staffers from 
contacting agencies about specific enforcement actions, without 
preclearance from the White House counsel’s office.”561  Even 
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committed industry friends like Senators John Breaux (R-Louisiana) 
and James Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) were careful to deny that they were 
attempting to “tell EPA not to enforce the law” even as they were 
urging the Cheney Task Force to suspend all of the NSR prosecutions 
pending an investigation into the legitimacy of the government’s 
position in those lawsuits.562 
I.  The Case for Assistance 
Underlying assistance-based approaches to regulation is the 
assumption that most regulatees are maximal compliers who are 
motivated by civic responsibilities beyond the simple maximization of 
profits.  Because their employees and the compliance consultants that 
they hire are professionals, regulatory agencies can trust companies to 
act lawfully to the extent that those professionals are able to ascertain 
the correct path from the complex, vague, and sometimes conflicting 
regulations that the agency has promulgated.563  The government 
should therefore treat regulatees as partners in the common pursuit 
of the agreed-upon goal of maximum compliance.564  Proponents of 
assistance-based approaches predict that educational programs, 
technical assistance, and subsidies will yield greater environmental 
improvement than “bean counting” exercises involving numbers of 
citations issued and amounts of fines assessed.565 
1.  Nonadversarial Relationships 
The primary disadvantage of deterrence-based regulation is its 
strong tendency to push the regulator and the regulatee into an 
adversarial relationship.  Proponents of assistance-based approaches 
argue that minimal compliers are far more likely to engage in 
contentious disputes over interpretations of vague requirements, 
rather than compromise in an effort to achieve a beneficial 
environmental outcome, when the government insists on strict 
enforcement of its interpretation of the relevant statutes and 
regulations.566  Supporters of assistance-based approaches view 
punishment as a legalistic last resort.567  Instead of filing deterrence-
based lawsuits, the agency should attempt to build a foundation of 
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mutual trust and respect to support cooperative efforts to come up 
with innovative and flexible solutions when differences in 
interpretation arise.568  Government officials can make compliance 
more palatable by demonstrating that compliance will produce 
measurable environmental improvements, by praising responsible 
companies in public forums, and by helping regulatees to identify and 
implement feasible compliance options (for example, through 
creative financing arrangements).569  Assistance-based tools like toll-
free “hotlines,” workshops and conferences, newsletters, and onsite 
visits will yield better results more quickly than seeking large fines in 
contentious enforcement litigation.570 
Supporters of deterrence-based approaches respond that it is 
surprisingly naïve to believe that most corporations are maximal 
compliers who are anxious to comply with the law.571  While 
cooperation between agency investigators and regulatees is an 
altogether laudable goal, corporations face strong incentives to violate 
the laws.572  When the government resorts to persuasion instead of 
deterrence, it is effectively conceding that the relevant rules are soft 
and negotiable.573  Flouters will ignore regulatory requirements until 
they are caught, and minimal compliers will interpret the 
requirements narrowly and the exemptions broadly to avoid spending 
scarce resources on controls that will not increase corporate profits.  
Civic responsibility may inspire some companies to become maximal 
compliers for some of the time, but shareholder demands for greater 
returns on their investments will ensure that most companies will 
remain minimal compliers.574  Supporters of deterrence-based 
enforcement are skeptical of the ability of professionals within 
corporations or in company-hired consulting companies to ensure 
that companies comply with the rules.  They are cynical enough to 
believe that the one who pays the piper calls the tune.  They worry 
that even professional organizations can become captured by the 
companies that hire their members.575 
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The experience of the electric power industry during the years 
between the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, which created NSR, 
and the Clinton administration’s NSR enforcement initiative in 1999 
bears this assessment out.  As we have seen, documents and analyses 
presented to the courts in the NSR enforcement litigation 
demonstrated that while EPA was adhering to the compliance 
assistance approach during the early years of NSR, owners of power 
plants were spending millions of dollars on projects that increased 
emissions and did not come within the RMRR exemption.576 
2.  Fewer Resources 
Another convincing argument in favor of the assistance-based 
approach is that it consumes fewer agency resources than strict 
deterrence-based programs.577  As a practical matter, “the capacity of 
company lawyers to exploit the complexity of the law and assert every 
legal right of their clients” means that full-scale prosecution “becomes 
very expensive and time-consuming.”578  NSR enforcement cases, for 
example, require investigators to review a huge volume of records on 
capital and maintenance expenditures over the life of every unit at 
the target facility, to analyze reams of historical data on the plant’s 
emissions, and to respond to document demands and other discovery 
requests from the defendants.579  The DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement 
initiative consumed a large proportion of OECA’s dwindling 
enforcement resources, and it consumed the time of about one-third 
of the attorneys in the Justice Department’s environmental 
enforcement division.580  The twenty-two settlements that resulted 
from the initiative as of mid-2012 took an average of seven years to 
complete.581 
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3.  Fewer Delays 
In addition to consuming many resources, the process of 
building and prosecuting consumes a great deal of time.582  Referring 
to the ongoing NSR litigation, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson 
complained that “[n]o one’s air gets any cleaner when you’re sitting 
in a courtroom.”583  Likewise, the head of DOJ’s environmental 
enforcement unit characterized the NSR litigation as “a slow boat to 
China.”584  Compliance assistance, by contrast, can proceed quite 
expeditiously at the ground level as the agency and the regulatee 
cooperatively search for the most efficient way to comply with the 
relevant requirements.  Promulgating clarifying regulations can 
achieve compliance more rapidly than lawsuits that may wend their 
way through the courts for years before regulatees obtain a definitive 
interpretation of ambiguous regulatory language.  The Duke Energy 
case, for example, went on for six-and-a-half years before public utility 
companies knew for certain that yearly, not hourly emissions were the 
relevant measure for determining whether projects crossed the NSR 
significance thresholds.585 
4.  Encouraging Maximal Compliance 
Supporters of assistance-based approaches believe that the 
“iterative process” of negotiation, mediation, technical assistance, 
bargaining and compromise is the most effective way to ensure 
compliance with comprehensive and sometimes cross-cutting 
regulatory requirements.586  The negotiations offer government 
enforcers an opportunity to “mitigate the perceived irrationality and 
unfairness of generally applicable regulations” promulgated by 
agencies that could not possibly have anticipated every regulatee’s 
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unique situation.587  During the negotiations, companies are more 
likely to accept advice from inspectors on protective steps that may be 
taken beyond those strictly required by the written rules, including 
developing and implementing new safety technologies.588  If treated as 
adversaries, however, they “will become resentful and less 
cooperative” minimal compliers, doing only what is absolutely 
required and no more.589 
5.  Reducing Unnecessary Burdens 
When an agency makes law on a case-by-case basis by applying 
broadly articulated factors to the facts before it in an enforcement 
action, it is hard for a company to know in advance how the agency 
will come out with respect to a particular project to which the 
company may need to devote millions of dollars and much staff 
time.590  This is especially true in the case of exemptions like the 
RMRR exclusions.591  Deterrence-based enforcement places a great 
burden on companies to anticipate in advance how the agency will 
react to their actions long after it is possible to reverse them.592  In 
addition to fostering uncertainty, enforcement litigation is 
economically burdensome to defendants who must hire lawyers, 
comply with broad discovery requests, and engage in public relations 
efforts to burnish their public images.593 
Supporters of deterrence-based approaches respond that 
uncertainties can usually be reduced a considerable degree by 
consulting agency guidance documents and by consulting with agency 
officials in advance of making heavy investments.  For example, 
companies concerned about whether a project will subject a source to 
NSR can ask EPA for an applicability determination prior to initiating 
a project.594  The argument that litigation subjects companies to 
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burdensome discovery requests presumes that the companies are in 
fact innocent.  The information that the litigation turned up in the 
NSR enforcement litigation, however, demonstrated that most of the 
defendants were far from innocent victims of arbitrary government 
attacks.  They had known for years that the expensive life extension 
projects they had undertaken were subject to NSR and did not come 
within any reasonable interpretation of the RMRR exemption.595  To a 
large extent, then, the burdens of litigation were self-imposed. 
The critics of the DOJ/EPA deterrence-based enforcement 
initiative raised a number of concerns specific to that litigation to 
bolster their argument that EPA should rely more heavily on 
assistance-based measures.  First, they argued that EPA should have 
solicited public comment on its broad interpretation of 
“modification” and narrow interpretation of the RMRR exemption in 
a full-fledged notice-and-comment rulemaking.596  In a collateral 
attack on the enforcement actions, a group of nonutility companies 
calling itself the Coalition for Responsible Regulations filed a separate 
action in the D.C. Circuit challenging the NSR enforcement initiative 
as a transparent attempt to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking.597  
EPA enforcers responded that the agency had already promulgated a 
set of rules, and the projects that it was pursuing in the litigation 
clearly violated those existing rules.598  The industry’s notice concerns 
were misplaced because each defendant had a full opportunity to 
respond to the agency’s interpretations of the regulations in the 
judicial hearings.  In any event, NSR enforcement actions were 
unsuited to rulemaking because the relevant facts varied from case to 
case, and the issues were therefore more appropriately addressed in 
individual adjudications.599 
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Second, the industry and upwind states argued that the litigation 
was adversely affecting state regulatory programs.  In many cases, state 
permitting authorities had issued NSR “nonapplicability” 
determinations concluding that specific projects were within the 
RMRR exemption.600  Second-guessing state agency decisions with 
federal enforcement actions, they argued, was inconsistent with the 
Clean Air Act’s clear preference for allowing states to function 
autonomously within the confines of their SIPs.601  Furthermore, if 
EPA’s narrow view of the RMRR exemption were correct, overworked 
state agencies would be deluged with thousands of additional requests 
for nonapplicability determinations.602  EPA responded that it simply 
could not trust state agencies in some upwind states to apply the NSR 
regulations stringently against local plants to protect air quality in 
downwind states.603  Since the NSR regulations did not require 
companies to report projects that, in their estimation, did not cross 
the significance thresholds or that came within the RMRR 
exemptions, state agencies would not necessarily even be aware of 
projects that violated the regulations.604 
Third, the critics argued that the litigation was discouraging 
efficiency-enhancing repairs and improvements that were necessary to 
protect worker safety and expand generating capacity.605  In the long 
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run, this would threaten the reliability of the nation’s electricity 
grids.606  It would also have the perverse effect of discouraging power 
plants from undertaking projects that would enhance environmental 
quality by increasing efficiency.607  Supporters of the initiative 
responded that strict deterrence-based enforcement of NSR would 
not discourage efficiency improvement projects that did not result in 
an increase in actual emissions, and assisting the industry by turning a 
blind eye on projects that did increase emissions would run contrary 
to the intent of the statute.608  According to EPA, the power plants that 
it had sued had not suffered any loss in capacity.609  Environmental 
groups scoffed at the notion that assisting companies by facilitating 
projects at existing plants would result in environmental 
improvements, because the modest efficiency gains available through 
tweaking existing plants would result in an equally modest reduction 
in pollutants per kilowatt hour.  The companies could achieve vastly 
greater efficiency gains by replacing older units with much more 
efficient (and less polluting) new units.610 
Fourth, critics of the NSR enforcement initiative argued that the 
settlements required “little more, if anything, than what the settling 
companies had already started doing for business and regulatory 
reasons.”611  In particular, while the litigation was pending, EPA had 
promulgated CAIR, which would have established a cap-and-trade 
regime for power plans in twenty-eight states.612  High-level EPA 
officials frequently cited CAIR in support of the agency’s attempts to 
revise the NSR regulations, arguing that any emissions increases 
brought about by the changes would be more than offset by emissions 
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reductions attributable to CAIR.613  In fact, the rule had little impact 
on emissions from existing sources because it was set aside by the D.C. 
Circuit, though the court allowed EPA to leave it in effect pending 
remand.614 
J.  Deterrence in Practice: A Very Successful NSR Enforcement Initiative 
By virtually any measure, the DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement 
initiative was a great success.  Of the 831 electricity- generating units 
that EPA investigated prior to 2012, it took some kind of enforcement 
action against 467, representing about forty-five percent of the coal-
fired electricity generating units in the United States.615  The initiative 
resulted in twenty-two major settlements covering 263 units, about 
thirty-two percent of the 831 units.616  According to the calculations of 
the Government Accountability Office, the companies that were 
parties to the settlements agreed to spend around $12.8 billion on 
pollution controls and pay around $80 million in fines.617  When fully 
implemented, the settlements are estimated to reduce SO2 emissions 
by more than 1.8 million tons per year and NOx emissions by more 
than 596,000 tons per year.618  An early analysis of EPA’s NSR 
enforcement initiative prepared for the Clean Air Task Force in 2002 
found that 5,500–9,000 deaths per year and 106,000–165,000 asthma 
attacks were attributable to the fifty-one power plants that were the 
subjects of the NSR lawsuits at that time.619  The study also determined 
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that 4,300–7,000 of those deaths and 80,000–120,000 of the asthma 
attacks could be avoided if the plants were required to install BACT.620  
Cleaning up the plants to BACT levels would cost about $3.6 billion 
per year and would yield health benefits of between $24–38 billion.621 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The highly successful DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement initiative can 
serve as a model for accomplishing major change through deterrence-
based enforcement.  In the late 1990s, at a time when political attacks 
on EPA were at a low point and its administrator was determined to 
bring about significant environmental improvement, the agency 
devoted a substantial share of its enforcement resources to the NSR 
program.622  It focused on the electric utility industry because 
preliminary investigations revealed that most of the companies were 
minimal compliers and a few were flouters.  The minimal compliers 
had grown quite accustomed to their own narrow interpretations of 
the word “modification” and expansive interpretations of the RMRR 
exemption, in part because EPA had done little to prevent the steady 
erosion of the meaning of its regulations.623 
When EPA finally did act, the industry cried foul, arguing that 
the agency was attempting to foist off a radical new interpretation of 
its regulations on the courts.624  Unfortunately for the industry, the 
courts did not accept its attempt to frame the issue, in part because a 
wealth of documents turned up during discovery strongly suggested 
that many companies knew full well that they were pressing the outer 
edges of reasonable interpretation as they undertook expensive life-
extension projects without undergoing NSR.625  Although the political 
dynamics of NSR shifted dramatically with the onset of the George W. 
Bush administration as EPA’s air office proposed changes that would 
have legalized much of the conduct that EPA enforcers had targeted, 
DOJ and EPA persisted in their efforts to enforce the law that existed 
at the time of the violations.626  The Obama administration 
reinvigorated the initiative in 2009 with positive results, indicating 
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that many more companies had crossed the line between minimal 
compliance and illegality.627 
In the end, the enforcement initiative yielded settlements with 
virtually all of the targeted companies, which should bring about 
major reductions in emissions of SO2 and NOx.
628  The initiative went 
on for more than a decade and it consumed many valuable resources, 
but it ultimately accomplished more than the Clear Skies proposal, 
which went nowhere in Congress, CAIR, which was overturned by the 
D.C. Circuit, and all of the Bush administration’s proposed changes 
to the NSR regulations, which, to the extent that they went into effect, 
gave sources greater latitude to avoid NSR.629  Although the DOJ/EPA 
initiative was clearly not favored by the Bush administration or by 
Republican members of Congress, it moved inexorably forward in 
neutral forums where the law, not political considerations, 
determined the outcome. 
One very powerful lesson that the NSR experience offers for the 
future is that old-fashioned deterrence-based enforcement works.  
The statistics on settlements lodged, pollution reduction promised, 
penalties paid, and lives saved in the last Part demonstrate the 
potential of a determined enforcement effort to accomplish genuine 
environmental gains.630  It is possible, of course, that the NSR 
enforcement is sui generis: EPA enforcers encountered an industry 
composed largely of flouters who had left behind an easily uncovered 
paper trail and could not craft a credible legal strategy to explain its 
unlawful conduct.  That explanation, however, does not square with 
the facts.  While there were no doubt flouters in the industry, most of 
the companies appeared to be aggressive minimal compliers who 
were careful to stay within the bounds of a credible, if ultimately 
unpersuasive, interpretation of the NSR regulations.  More important, 
the NSR initiative included more than one industry.  For example, 
many of the defendants were petroleum refineries and paper 
companies that also entered into settlements that produced large 
reductions in emissions.631 
A second lesson to take away from the NSR experience is that 
strict enforcement is far less susceptible to political manipulation than 
rulemaking.  Once a lawsuit has been filed, the professional attorneys 
in DOJ and EPA take over, and it becomes very difficult for even 
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powerful political actors such as Senator Inhofe and Vice President 
Cheney to wrest control of the lawsuits away from the professionals.632  
Even a sustained effort by the Bush administration to change the 
underlying rules in ways that undercut the enforcement effort failed 
to cause the EPA and DOJ enforcers to back away from the pending 
cases, though these efforts did periodically prevent EPA investigators 
from pursuing new NSR enforcement cases.633  In the final analysis, 
accusations of political interference with DOJ efforts to bring 
wrongdoers to justice are usually enough to cause politicians to back 
off. 
The third lesson of the NSR enforcement initiative is that strict 
deterrence-based enforcement consumes large quantities of scarce 
enforcement resources.634  In a time of governmental austerity, this is 
an important impediment to deterrence-based enforcement programs 
in the federal government.  More than any other factor, the 
availability of enforcement resources determines the probability that 
violations will be detected and vigorously prosecuted.  Yet, vigorous 
enforcement will always be needed to bring flouters to justice and to 
send a message to minimal compliers that they should think twice 
about getting too close to the line between lawful and unlawful 
conduct.635  Congress must therefore recognize its continuing 
responsibility to appropriate sufficient funds to EPA and DOJ for 
them to undertake major enforcement initiatives in the future. 
A fourth lesson is that agency attempts to amend the regulations 
underlying an enforcement initiative to assist the relevant industry will 
inevitably undermine that initiative, despite the agency’s protestations 
to the contrary.636  In theory, a company is bound by the rules that 
were in effect at the time that it engaged in the allegedly unlawful 
conduct, even if those rules are changed to legalize that particular 
conduct in the future.  Respect for the rule of law demands that 
violators be punished for their actions, even if they successfully lobby 
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the agency to change the rules before the completion of the 
enforcement actions.  In practice, however, the fact that the 
government no longer thinks that the regulation is needed can have a 
profound effect on the ongoing litigation.637  Judges may be less 
inclined to allow the cases to go forward when it is not clear that the 
government believes that compliance will bring about needed 
improvements, and they may be even less inclined to administer stiff 
penalties to minimal compliers for conduct that pressed the outer 
interpretational limits of regulations that are no longer applicable. 
A fifth lesson is that citizen enforcement provisions in statutes 
allow representatives of the beneficiaries of regulatory programs to 
play a vital backup role in cases in which the federal government is 
unwilling or unable to enforce the law.638  The purpose of the sixty-day 
notice requirement is to allow the federal government to initiate and 
control the course of the enforcement action before the citizens file 
their lawsuits.639  State attorneys general and environmental groups 
can effectively force the federal government’s hand by filing a sixty-
day notice and daring the government not to intervene. More 
important, they can discourage DOJ from abandoning a lawsuit that it 
has already filed by threatening to take over the litigation in the 
government’s absence.  After President Bush mandated a DOJ review 
of the pending NSR litigation, for example, it was clear that Vice 
President Cheney and Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham wanted 
DOJ to drop some or all of those cases.640  The environmental groups 
and state attorneys general who had intervened in those cases made it 
clear, however, that they would press ahead with the cases if the 
federal government withdrew.641  The net effect of the citizen 
enforcement provisions of the Clean Air Act was to act as an inertial 
force against the government’s attempt to reverse course in the 
middle of a major enforcement initiative. 
The choice between deterrence-based approaches and assistance-
based approaches is not an all-or-nothing proposition.  Any particular 
regulatory regime lies on a spectrum with strict deterrence at one 
extreme and gratuitous assistance at the other.  A regulatory regime 
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can provide assistance to regulatees through guidance documents, 
seminars, and training sessions and still be deterrence-based when the 
agency makes it clear that it will vigorously prosecute flouters and 
minimal compliers who go too far in exploiting gray areas.  The 
question for EPA and other regulatory agencies is where to locate 
their programs on the spectrum. 
In a society that prides itself on adherence to the rule of law, the 
expectation is that most companies are maximal compliers who do 
their best to ascertain and comply with the laws and regulations that 
protect consumers, workers, and the environment from unacceptable 
risks.  The economics of compliance, however, ensure that companies 
are more likely to be minimal compliers who are determined to divert 
the fewest possible resources to compliance with regulations that do 
not add to their bottom lines.  And every regulatory regime will 
encounter flouters who are happy to ignore legal restrictions until 
they are caught.  How the regulatory agency goes about enforcement 
depends on its assessment of the proportions of its regulatees that fall 
into each of these three categories.  EPA’s experience with the 
electric utility industry’s compliance with the Clean Air Act’s NSR 
requirements suggests that when an agency encounters an industry 
dominated by aggressive minimal compliers, a deterrence-based 
strategy is likely to be more successful than an assistance-based 
strategy that assumes that most regulatees happily obey that law. 
